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Araştırma Makalesi / Research Article

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ATTITUDE IN THE PROCESS LEADING TO THE LIBERATION OF IZMIR (August-September 1922)*

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Abstract

The Turkish War of Independence continued for more than 3 years and ended with the liberation of İzmir from the Allied occupation on September 9, 1922. The victory won after a great struggle on three big fronts laid the foundations for the new state to be established. In the struggle for independence led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a diplomatic and military struggle was given at the same time. This struggle had been both the Turkish Grand National Assembly's struggle for its existence in the international arena and the existence of the Turkish Nation against those who wanted to end its existence as a nation. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who set out with the principle of "Independence or Death", and the heroic assembly never compromised on the decisions of the National Pact, regardless of the circumstances, and declared that they were in favor of accepting all kinds of peace conditions that did not contradict the national independence and sovereignty.

In this process, the diplomatic efforts with the United States of America in the Turkish War of Independence were of great importance. Delegations, semi-official and official statesmen sent by the United States to Turkey at various times played an important role in promoting Turkey's struggle in the international community. Meetings were held with the delegations sent from America and the most important political leaders, and Turkey's demands on the most important issues were expressed in these meetings.

In this study, we have researched the issues that came to the fore in the American official archive documents in the last 2 months of the Turkish War of Independence's victory (August and September). We particularly selected and researched these two months as the last

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There is no study that would require the approval of the Ethical Committee in this article.

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months before the recapture of Izmir by Turkish armies. We tried to reveal how the political leaders of America, which we can accept as impartial, handle some of the controversial issues even today. While doing this, we made primary use of the original official documents in the Gale National Archive documents. We consulted original British official archives and newspapers, as well as American newspapers, on some subjects that we needed to compare.

In this study, the articles about Turkey in the American archive documents in August and September of 1922 will be discussed in detail.

Keywords: *Greco-Turkish War, Admiral Bristol, Liberation of Izmir, Open Door Diplomacy, Monroe Doctrine, Woodrow Wilson.*

İZMİR'İN KURTULUŞUNA GİDEN SÜREÇTE AMERİKA BİRLEŞİK DEVLETLERİNİN TUTUMU (AĞUSTOS EYLÜL 1922)

Öz

Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı 3 yılı aşkın bir süre devam etmiş ve 9 Eylül 1922 tarihinde İzmir'in düşman işgalinden kurtarılmasıyla son bulmuştur. Üç büyük cephede topyekun verilen büyük bir mücadele sonrası kazanılan zafer kurulacak yeni devletin temellerini atmıştır. Mustafa Kemal Paşa önderliğinde yürütülen bağımsızlık savaşında askeri ve diplomatik mücadele eş zamanlı sürdürülmüştür. Bu süreç, hem Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin uluslararası alanda kendini kabul ettirme hem de bir ulus olarak varlığına son vermek isteyenlere karşı Türk Milleti'nin var oluş mücadelesi olmuştur. "Ya İstiklal Ya Ölüm" ilkesi ile yola çıkan Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve kahraman meclis koşullar ne olursa olsun Misak-ı Milli kararlarından asla taviz vermemiş, mili bağımsızlığına ve egemenliğine ters düşmeyen her türlü barış koşulunu kabule taraftar olduğunu beyan etmiştir.

Bu süreçte Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı'nda Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile yürütülen diplomasi çabaları büyük önem arz etmektedir. Amerika'nın çeşitli dönemlerde Türkiye'ye gönderdiği heyetler, yarı-resmi ve resmi devlet adamları Türkiye'nin mücadelesinin uluslararası kamuoyunda tanıtılmasında önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Amerika'dan gönderilen heyetlerle en önemli devlet adamları nezdinde görüşmeler gerçekleşmiş Türkiye'nin en önemli konularda talepleri bu görüşmelerde dile getirilmiştir.

Biz bu çalışmamızda, Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın zafere giden süreçteki son 2 ayında (Ağustos-Eylül) Amerikan resmi arşiv belgelerinde ön plana çıkan konuları araştırdık. Bu iki ayı özellikle İzmir'in Türk orduları tarafından alınmasından önceki son aylar olduğu için araştırdık.

Günümüzde dahi tartışmalı olan bazı konuların tarafsız kabul edebileceğimiz Amerika'nın devlet adamlarının nezdinde nasıl ele alındığını ortaya koymaya çalıştık. Bunu yaparken orjinal Gale Ulusal Arşiv dokümanlarında yer alan resmî belgelerden birinci derecede faydalandık. Karşılaştırma gereği duyduğumuz bazı konularda orjinal İngiliz resmi arşivlerine, gazetelerine ve ayrıca Amerikan gazetelerine başvurduk.

Anahtar Sözcükler: *Türk-Yunan Savaşı, Amiral Bristol, İzmir'in Kurtuluşu, Açık Kapı Diplomasisi, Monroe Doktrini, Woodrow Wilson.*

Introduction

During the days of the War of Independence, the main aims of the policy of the Nationalists against the Western States as well as the Eastern States were to realize the National Pact, to ensure Turkey's recognition in foreign countries, to obtain material and moral assistance within the framework of various agreements and to use a wide range of propaganda tools to achieve these goals.

However, this policy was changing in the face of difficult conditions. The Nationalists were fighting against the Western Allies, which had occupied most of their homeland and the capital of the Ottoman Empire. Nationalists seemed not to have the military forces to compel invading states to retreat from Turkey through either diplomacy or war; nevertheless, they tried to solve the problems through the former. If the Allied states recognized the National Oath¹ and offered an honorable peace to Turkey, the Nationalists were open to agreeing.²

The National Struggle took place on 3 fronts: South, East, and West. One of the most difficult fronts was the western front, where Turkey fought against Greece, supported by the Allied Powers, especially the United Kingdom. The Greco-Turkish war falls into 3 stages, corresponding roughly to the campaigns of 1920, 1921, and 1922. In the first, the Turks, hopelessly outmatched in numbers and material, were badly defeated, and Greek forces advanced in both Anatolia and Rumelia. The second Greek campaign, in 1921, also opened well for the invaders, who made several important gains. However, the Turks fought back repeatedly at Inonu and Eskisehir-Kutahya, and on 23 August 1921, a great battle took place, the Sakaria Battle, and Turkish forces, under the personal command of Mustafa Kemal, won a decisive victory.³ The Nationalists were

1 (National Oath) is the set of six decisions made by the last term of the [Ottoman Parliament](#). Parliament met on 28 January 1920 and published its decisions on 12 February 1920. Due to the National Oath:

The status of [Kars](#), [Ardahan](#), and [Batumi](#) may be determined by a referendum.

The status of [Western Thrace](#) will be determined by the votes of its inhabitants.

The security of [Constantinople](#) and [Marmara](#) should be provided for. Transport and free trade on the Straits of the [Bosporus](#) and the [Dardanelles](#) will be determined by Turkey and other concerned countries.

The rights of minorities will be issued on the condition that the rights of the Muslim minorities in neighboring countries are protected.

To develop in every field, the country should be independent and free; all restrictions on political, judicial, and financial development will be removed. For details and The Republic of Turkey's borders according to the original National Pact: *ATASE Arşivi*, İŞH, K: 23, G: 50, B: 6,7.

2 Salahi Sonyel, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Dış Politika II*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, Ankara, 1991, p.68

3 Sakaria Battle is one of the main parts of The National Struggle. The outcome of this battle would determine not only the ongoing fighting on the Western Front but also the future of the Turkish nation. Turkish-French diplomatic relations continued in 1921, but they did not come to an end due to the insistence of the Nationalists on the National Pact. After the Battle of Sakaria was won, the Turkish-French negotiations resumed in Ankara on September 24,

now internationally recognized as a powerful force, and by some, as the real government of Turkey. The Soviets had already signed an agreement with them in March 1921, fixing the frontier and establishing friendly relations. The French now did the same. In October, a new Franco-Turkish treaty was signed with the nationalists, drawing up a new Turco-Syrian frontier far more favorable to Turkey than that laid down in the treaty of Sevres. In addition, it provided for the French evacuation of Cilicia. The Italians withdrew from their zone in southern Anatolia, stipulating only their retention of the Dodecanese islands. These withdrawals and agreements greatly strengthened the military position of the nationalist forces, who now in addition began to acquire large quantities of arms.⁴ In August 1922, the third and final phase of the war began. The Turks won a crushing victory at Dumlupınar, and driving the Greeks before them, reoccupied Izmir on 9 September, thus completing the recapture of Anatolia.⁵

1. The United States of America (USA) Policy During The National Struggle

The “Eastern Question” has a history of more than a century, and there were differences between the perspective of the USA and the Allies on the solution. At first, the Allies wanted to reshape the Middle East and created spheres of influence, shared out among themselves in the secret agreements they signed during the 1st World War; however, Wilson was against these secret agreements from the very beginning. He rejected the economic spheres of influence, instead demanding the application of the principle of national self-determination, and the application of the “Open Door” principle, which would eliminate the spheres of influence, allowing instead free competition. In this period, the USA wanted to have a say in the new regulations to be made on the Middle East by collecting information about the region through the delegations it sent to the Middle East. King-Crane was sent to the Middle East, Bristol was sent to Western Anatolia after the occupation of Izmir, and Harbord Delegations were sent to the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia. They made investigations and reported the wishes of the peoples of the region to the Paris Peace Conference (January 18, 1919- January 21, 1920). Despite the political nature of the activities of the delegations, these investigations also had an economic dimension, reflecting the interest of the USA in the region. During their studies, both Admiral Bristol and General Harbord examined the commercial activities, underground resources, transportation opportunities, and production possibilities in the regions. By the

1921, and resulted in the Ankara Agreement signed by Franklin Boullion and Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Kemal on October 20, 1921. As a consequence of this treaty, Turkey would be able to gather almost all its forces on the Western Front against the Greek army. With this treaty, France officially recognized the National Pact. İzzet Öztoprak, *Türk ve Batı Kamuoyunda Milli Mücadele*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Publication, Ankara, 1989, pp.221-222.

4 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p.253.

5 Lewis, *ibid*, p.253.

doctrine of President Monroe, the USA followed a policy of “solitude” in the century until the First World War, and did not interfere in world affairs, nor permitted European countries to interfere in the USA.⁶ Apart from this, the USA had taken steps to develop some political, commercial, and cultural relations with European countries and Turkey for its economic interests. These relations, which were established both in the field of trade and of culture, led to constant disagreements between the two sides.⁷

It is a fact that the United States, which first became involved in world affairs when it exceeded the old policy principles and participated in the 1st World War, influenced Turkey politically in this period. In particular, the principles put forward by President Wilson for world peace, and the hopes attached to the USA in Turkey at the end of the Mudros armistice, which was later disappointed, seemed to lead to some political conflicts between Turkey and the USA.⁸

At the beginning of the National Struggle, the Turkish-American political relationship was not similar to the relations of England, France, and Italy with Turkey. These imperialist states were able to extract many benefits from the Ottoman lands. Before the war and after, they concluded some important secret agreements about the partition of Turkey. President Wilson initially did not want to recognize these treaties, nor did the USA have any territorial claims in the Middle East. The USA only wanted to preserve the religious and cultural institutions in this region, ensure free passage through the Bosphorus Straits and protect its commercial interests. However, when work for the peace conference began in Paris, Wilson was forced to abandon his peaceful principles. Experienced European politicians, especially Lloyd George, wanted to give USA responsibility in the Middle East, and thus, the mandate issue first emerged onto the agenda in Paris.⁹ President Wilson was working to bring a new order to

6 Fahir Armaoglu, *Türk Amerikan İlişkileri*, Kronik Kitap, İstanbul, 2019, pp.25-29., Nuri Karakaş, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Tasfiye Sürecinde Amerikan Politikası*, *Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi*, Volume XXV, Number:1, July, 2010, pp.284-285.

7 Turkey-American relations, which started in 1830, gave American citizens in the Ottoman countries the right to benefit from capitulation privileges. In this period, America also engaged in intense cultural activity in the Ottoman State. Cultural institutions led by American missionaries were established in many places. Robert College in Istanbul, and the other missionary schools in İzmir, Samsun, Merzifon, Kayseri, and Mersin. Especially in the years when the Ottoman Empire lost its former power, the interest and support of the American missionary schools on Armenian nationalism forced the Ottoman Empire to take some measures. America, which joined the war on the side of the Allied Powers in 1917, did not declare war on Turkey, but only cut off relations. Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Anadolu'daki Amerika-Kendi Belgeleriyle 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki Amerikan Misyoner Okulları*, İmge Publication, Ankara, 2000, p.48-50, Haluk Selvi, “Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde Ermeni Faaliyetleri (1892-1896)”, *Ermeni Araştırmaları I.Türkiye Kongre Bildirileri*, ASAM-EREN Publication, Ankara 2003, Vol:3, p.27-28, Seçil Akgün, “Amerikalı Misyonerlerin Anadolu'ya Bakışları”, *Otam*, Sayı: III, Ankara, pp.4-12

8 Sabahattin Selek, *Anadolu İhtilali*, Kastaş Publication, İstanbul, 2020, p. 508.

9 Selek, *ibid*, pp.510-512.

the world and position as leader of the world, but the American public and the majority of the Senate did not think like him. To them, Wilson had turned his back on the traditional Monroe doctrine, and therefore the League of Nations proposal and the Treaty of Versailles were rejected by the Senate. In November 1920, Wilson's presidency came to an end and the United States returned its Monroe Doctrine. After Wilson's foreign policy failure, Republican candidate Warren Harding won the presidential race on November 2, 1920.¹⁰

The presidential change in the United States was also reflected in Turkey's policy. "*Vakit*" newspaper published articles describing this change, emphasizing that the presidential election will create a significant change in USA's domestic and foreign policy. According to the newspaper, Wilson made serious misjudgments in his policy, particularly during the Paris Conference, acting entirely in line with his views and informing neither the American Senate nor the American public opinion. He insisted on his principles and the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles, but the Senate rejected this. This was his first defeat. The second defeat was over the role of the USA in the drawing of the borders with Armenia. After all these mistakes, he fell out of favor with his people and lost the elections.¹¹ Warren Harding became president on March 4, 1921.¹² From that date on, America fully reverted to the Monroe Doctrine and started to follow a policy of "isolationism". Harding expressed his thoughts on Turkey at various times, stating that while the United States would always help Armenia, she would never interfere in Turkey's internal affairs. He also expressed his hope that peace be agreed upon between Greece and Turkey as soon as possible.¹³

During 1921 and 1922, the USA continued its policy of monitoring developments in Turkey from afar. Admiral Bristol¹⁴ informed her about Turkey

10 Kenan Özkan, *Mondros Mütarekesi'nden Lozan Barış Konferansı'na Milli Mücadele Dönemi Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri (1918-1923)*, Ötüken Publication, İstanbul, 2016, p.262.

11 "Amerika İntihabatı ve Biz", *Vakit*, 6 Teşrinisani 1336, no: 1046, s. 1. "Amerika İntihabatının Neticeleri", *Vakit*, 13 Kanunisani 1336, no: 1081, s. 1., Özkan, ibid, p. 264.

12 Laurence Evans, *Türkiye'nin Paylaşılması (1914-1924)*, Milliyet Publication, İstanbul, 1972, p.305.

13 Özkan, ibid, p.264.

14 Admiral Mark L. Bristol, the American High Commissioner to Turkey during the years 1919-1927 and the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean. Between 1920-1923 Bristol asserted on at least six occasions, that American foreign policy in the Near East was based in part on the principle of the Open Door and that he was working diligently for its implementation. The Admiral applied this principle not only to the Allies who were then seeking to gain control of Turkey and her former Empire but also to the Turks and the American missionaries and businessmen as well. Bristol arrived on January 28, 1919, in İstanbul, where he served as the chief diplomatic representative of the United States until 1927. At the time of Bristol's arrival in İstanbul, the United States enjoyed a benevolent reputation in Turkey, an advantage Bristol pressed to further American economic goals. One hundred years of American Protestant missionary effort in Turkey has created a good American image. That the United States neither declared war on Turkey nor participated in the secret wartime treaties, designed by the Allies for the partition of the "Sick Man of Europe", added to the stock of American goodwill in Turkey. Bristol was also careful to

during these years and America gave more importance to commercial relations than political relations.

Commissioned in Turkey upon the 1918 Armistice of Mudros, a diplomat named Lewis Heck was the first American representative. He started to work in Istanbul in December 1918. He started to send reports on Turkey's internal situation at the beginning of 1919. He emphasized that the information received from Anatolia is insufficient and recommended that the American consuls return to duty in Turkey.¹⁵

The USA did not remain indifferent to the National Movement being organized in Anatolia. However, Washington did not clarify its stance on the relations to be established with Ankara until after the Battle of Sakaria, when it sent a representative to Ankara, albeit semi-officially. First, Julian Gillespie was sent to Ankara in December 1921 as Commercial Attaché.¹⁶ Later, in June 1922 Robert Imbrie was sent as a representative. While in Ankara, Imbrie wrote reports in favor of Turkey.¹⁷ America tried to get closer to Turkey to support its commercial interests. On the other hand, Ankara's intention to contact Washington was to avoid the political loneliness in the face of the European alliance. On the one hand, it used the sincere relations established with Bolshevik Russia to intimidate Europe, while on the other; it planned to win America as an ally.

The first attempt of the Ankara Government to establish an "official" relationship with the USA was in January 1921. On this date, an attempt was made by the American High Commissioner in Istanbul, Admiral Bristol to re-establish "friendly" relations between the Ankara Government and the United States. However, Turkey insisted that its political and economic independence should be

avoid pursuing any policy concerning the Armenian mandate that would antagonize the Turks. For instance, Bristol has unalterably opposed an American mandate for Armenia, a responsibility that President Wilson had conditionally accepted at Paris Peace Conference in May 1919. The Open-Door principle was Admiral Bristol's major tool to achieve the primary purpose of economic expansion. To attain this goal, Bristol pursued a sixfold policy that would first enhance American goodwill in Turkey; second, create a climate in that country conducive to economic expansion; third, neutralize Allied efforts to monopolize commerce with Turkey; fourth create an American infrastructure that would facilitate economic penetration; fifth, fashion an integrated American economic system that would result in increased economic benefits; and sixth, encourage American business concerns to compete aggressively for new markets in the Middle East. Thomas A. Bryson, "Admiral Mark L. Bristol, An Open-Door Diplomat in Turkey", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.5, No:4, September 1974, pp. 451-454, Lewis, *ibid*, pp.248-249. İsmail Köse, "Paris Barış Konferansı Tutanakları ve Başkan Woodrow Wilson'un Türk Algısı", *History Studies*, Vol.: 6, No: 3, 2014, pp. 217-238., Evans, *ibid*, p.177-260.

15 Bilal Şimşir, "Türk- Amerikan İlişkilerinin Yeniden Kurulması ve Ahmet Muhtar Bey'in Vaşington Büyükelçiliği (1920-1927)", *Türk Tarih Kurumu, Belleten*, Issue: 41, Vol: 162, p.277. (pp.277-356).

16 Metin Ayışığı, *Kurtuluş Savaşı Sırasında Türkiye'ye Gelen Amerikan Heyetleri*, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 2004, p. 70.

17 Şimşir, *ibid*, p.300., Evans, *ibid*, p.338., Orhan Duru, *Amerikan Gizli Belgeleriyle Türkiye'nin Kurtuluş Yılları*, Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Publications, January, 2001, p. 175.

recognized and the capitulations abolished, on the conditions no sound came from Washington. Nonetheless, as Admiral Bristol had insisted on establishing contact with the Ankara Government, the American Government decided as a temporary measure to send Julian Gillespie from the American Trade Representative in Istanbul to Ankara. Meanwhile, the Ankara Agreement was signed with France, which consequently recognized the Grand National Assembly Government. Gillespie came to Ankara in December 1921 and stayed until February 1922. During the days, he stayed in Turkey, Gillespie met with Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Dr. Adnan, Yusuf Kemal, and Rauf Bey. Rauf Bey stated to him that the Ankara Government intended to offer all privileges in Turkey to neutral countries, including the USA, upon the successful conclusion of the war, that Turkey's support for Mosul continues, and that priority would be given to the initiative to be made to the American group on oil resources. According to Gillespie, the Turkish government was in favor of Americans helping Turkey's economic development and was happy to allow American capital into the country.¹⁸

All concerned, especially Atatürk, in Ankara, were keen to meet Gillespie. In June 1922, America sent another person, this time a "diplomat" named Robert W. Imbrie. When Ankara was informed that Imbrie would be sent, the Government claimed as a condition the official recognition, and permission for the Ankara Government to send a representative to Washington. However, America did not accept these terms, and Atatürk, keen to establish a connection with America, had to abandon these conditions. After Imbrie came to Ankara, in a press statement, he emphasized his friendly feelings towards the Turks and confirmed his support for the National Movement, and stated his intention to promote the Turks in the USA.¹⁹

2. Topics Reflected on Turkey in the American Archives in the Process Leading to the Liberation of Izmir

The USA archive documents show that the major topics were as follows: "*Preoccupation Claims of Istanbul by Greece*", "*House of Common Debates about Turkey-Greece War*", "*Possible Peace Talks Between Greece and Turkey*", "*Conditions of Turkey for Peace*", "*Great Attack*" and "*Capture of Izmir by Turks*."

2.a. Preoccupation Claims of Istanbul by Greece

While the Turks had been growing in strength, the Greeks were weakened by dissension and changes in regime and policy at home. On the other hand, the continuation of the Turkish-Greek conflict brought new claims to the agenda in Greece. The Greek administration, in despair after the Battle of Sakaria, was

18 Ayışığı, *ibid*, pp.70-71.

19 Fahir Armaoğlu, *ibid*, pp.30-31.

considering invading Istanbul as a last resort to force the Allies to pressure the Nationalists. Gounaris and Constantine switched their attention to Constantinople. They swiftly removed two divisions from Asia Minor and transferred them across the Sea of Marmara to reinforce their troops in Thrace. With a strong force thus threatening the lines of Chatalja, they demanded the permission of the Allies to enter Constantinople. By this threat, they sought to put pressure on the Allies to resolve the conflict in their favor, or at least to save their faces, as the Allies once again contemplated peace discussions-this time at Venice.

An entry into the city would be a simple enough operation. It would restore the local prestige of Constantine's regime, revive the confidence of his army, and provide him with a valuable bargaining asset. Harrington entrusted their defense to a French general, with French and British troops which at once started to entrench. He issued a statement, on his responsibility that the troops of both powers would combine to resist any attack on the occupation forces. Rumbold returned hurriedly from leave and an Allied meeting at the British Embassy confirmed this. British warships made a demonstration in the Marmara. The Greeks withdrew a short distance but continued to land troops. Lloyd George upheld the decision, and the Greeks agreed to advance no further without Allied approval. The Greeks had lost their last chance, and in the process, weakened their defenses on the Anatolian front.²⁰

The occupation of Istanbul by Greek armies was proclaimed on August 1, 1922. USA Ambassador, Harvey, sent an official telegram to the Secretary of State, Washington D.C. In it, Harvey stated that, in the House of Commons, Prime Minister announced that on July 29, 1922, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to the British representative in Athens a note. This stated that the Greek Government had concluded that only the Greek army's occupation of Constantinople would bring about peace, and therefore the Greek Government asked the Allies to give the necessary orders to their occupying troops. Harvey also stated that on the same day, a note from the British representative in Athens, in compliance with instructions from London, warned the Greek Government that serious consequences would ensue from such a step. In reply, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs gave positive assurances that there was no cause for alarm and that the Greek forces would not account to enter the neutral zone without Allied consent.²¹ On August 2, 1922, Bristol noted that the Greek Foreign Minister wrote two notes given to the British, French, and Italian Ministers in Athens. It was cited that Greeks had received encouragement to propose an occupation of Constantinople to bring Turks to terms. In addition, mentioned that the Greeks might have counted upon public opinion, especially in England

20 Patrick Kinross, *Ataturk The Rebirth of A Nation*, Phoenix Press, London, 1995, p.305.

21 Central File: Decimal File 767.68, Political Relations Of States, Relations; Bi-Lateral Treaties., Turkey And Greece, June 18, 1914 - September 25, 1922. National Archives (United States), Paper No: 767.68/238.

and America, to back their ambitions for the occupation of Constantinople, along the line of the popular cry. “Kick Turkey out of Europe”.

Bristol evaluated the occupation of Constantinople by the Greeks as making conditions more complex. He wrote in a report that it might defer the consummation of peace in the Near East. He initiated that if the Greeks were allowed to occupy Constantinople, the opposition of Russia would be immediately felt, and the Turks and the Russians would likely be drawn closer together in opposition to Greece and the Western Powers. This would also draw closer German bonds with Russia and Turkey. Bristol also underlined the effect upon the whole Moslem world would also have to be taken into consideration. He also criticized the Allies’ manner in which they initially ignored the Turkish nationalists and tried to bluff them, and now treated them virtually based on a sovereign state. He also recalled the arguments advanced at the peace conference by Greece and especially by Mr. Venizelos in favor of a Greek occupation of Smyrna with an ultimate cession of part of Anatolia to Greece were based upon misrepresentations, forged documents, and inaccurate statistics. He underlined that the International Commission of Inquiry established beyond doubt that in 1919, during the Greek occupation of Smyrna, there was no evidence of Christian massacres in that territory. He stated as below:

“The documents produced to show that there was a secret organization amongst the Turks to massacre Christians were undoubted forgeries. The statistics produced regarding the proportion of Greek population in the territory that Greece desired ceded to Greece were inaccurate and upon this basis, there was no justification for any territory in western Anatolia being ceded to Greece.” He again declared that this International Committee had a unanimous opinion that Greeks should withdraw from Anatolia because their occupation of that country had never been justified. Bristol suggested it had to remember that the United States was a party to the Agreement for the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks and therefore in a measure was responsible for the present situation in the Near East. Bristol’s opinion about the occupation claims of Istanbul is as below:

“It will be noted that the Greek Government refers to the atrocities committed by the Turks while forgetting the atrocities and massacres that the Greeks committed when they first occupied the Smyrna district and the atrocities they have committed ever since in their advance and military operations in Anatolia. Inter-Allied Commission reported last summer that the Greeks, not only the irregulars but regular Greek troops did commit wholesale atrocities on the south coast of the Sea of Marmara. The reports of Mr. Arnold Toynbee made during a tour through the Greek zone of occupation last year indicate that the Greeks are terrorizing the Turkish population and persecuting them. When the Greeks retreated from the Sakaria River they devastated the whole country. In the same way, when the Greeks advanced in the Meander Valley during their occupation of Smyrna in 1919 they destroyed and burned every village and drove the whole population into exile.”²²

22 Bristol to Secretary of State, Papers Related..., No: 767.68/260.

Bristol indicated that this war was due to Greek's neutral hatred of the Turks, and was not for the sake of humanity. Therefore, his report advised the Allies not to support Greeks against Nationalist Turks. He also pointed out, that in Russia and Turkey practically nothing was being produced, and therefore, there was nothing for trade. In addition, vast sums of money were being expended by the military operations of Greece and Turkey and by the Military Occupation by the Allies of Turkey, including Mesopotamia, Palestine, and Syria. The Allies in this part of the world were fighting tooth and nail to prevent American commercial development, and excessively spending on military occupation and encouraging military operations, while failing to pay the interest on their legitimate debts. Because of these debts and the non-payment of interest, the American people were suffering from the necessary high taxation, while in these vast countries of the Near East, American commerce and trade could not expand. Therefore, Bristol pointed out the vital importance of the situation in the Near East, and he recommended very strongly that America carefully studied the situation and established peace in the Near East with at least possible delay. Thus, these countries might begin producing and return to normal conditions as soon as possible. Bristol also suggested that when the Allies intimated that America might cancel their debts, and when the Allies asked for consideration in funding these debts, America might in return demand that they stop unnecessary expenditures on useless military operations.²³

In addition, on August 4, 1922, an official telegram from Caffery²⁴, USA Greece Charge d'affaires was received by the American Department of State. In that telegram, Caffery cited that many Greek soldiers wandered across the frontier, and attached to a Turkish outpost, several Greeks were killed. The American embassy interpreted these words as the recent efforts of the Greeks to attack Istanbul.²⁵ On August 4, 1922, two more important letters reached the USA Department. One of them was from Harvey, American Ambassador in London, to the Secretary of State asserted that UK Prime Minister had given assurances that the Government would take measures to prevent the Greeks from occupying Constantinople during recess in parliament.²⁶ The other was sent by Bristol (American *High Commissioner* in Istanbul) to Secretary State, who stated that Allied troops were in the process of being placed in position along the neutral line to oppose a possible Greek advance. In addition, it stated that General Harrington with all the Allied forces under his command would oppose violations of neutrality of the zone. The Sultan ordered his local troops to assist the Allies to maintain order in the zone. In addition, Bristol stated that the Greek Government had informed the Allies that the Greeks should be

23 Bristol to Secretary of State, Papers Related..., No: 767.68/260.

24 Jefferson Caffery, **Chargé d'Affaires ad interim (Greece)**, <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/caffery-jefferson>.

25 Caffery to Secretary of State, Papers Related..., No: 767.68/240.

26 Harvey to Secretary of State, Papers Related...No: 767.68/242.

given the privilege of occupying the zone to make peace with Turkey as soon as possible. Differences of opinion between France and England were also mentioned in the correspondence, which stated that it was not known whether the Allied Governments were supporting Harrington. The issue of support for Greeks was also raised in the American archive documents. For instance, Bristol sent two telegrams on August 7, 1922. In the first, he underlined an easing in the tension due to the Greek military operations in Thrace directed towards the occupation of Constantinople²⁷ In the second, he said that evidence shows British Government were supporting Greek moves, and high British military officials were non-plussed at their government's attitude.²⁸

When we also looked at the British archive documents, we more easily understood how the Allies viewed the occupation of Istanbul by the Greeks. Sir H. Rumbold sent a telegram to the Earl of Balfour on August 3, 1922. In it, he noted that Allied admirals communicated to Allied High Commissioners a draft note which they proposed to send to the Greek admiral there in the event of Greek troops crossing the neutral zone boundary in force. In that note, they laid down:

That all Greek men-of-war at ports in the Bosphorus or Sea of Marmora are to remain at their anchorage without communication with the shore or by wireless telegraph.

All such as are at sea in the Sea of Marmora or the Black Sea are to return to their bases. The base for the latter is to be anchorage at Kavak.

All movements of transports or auxiliaries in these waters to cease.

No fresh man-of-war, transport, or auxiliary to pass the Dardanelles.

Any infringement of these orders will be repressed by force.

Further orders will be as regards disposal of Greek ships to which orders applied.²⁹

When we examined this and other such correspondence in the British archive, we realized that the Allies did not view positively the occupation of Istanbul by the Greeks, as a kind of occupation that would clash with their interests.

2.b. Possible Peace Talks Between Greece and Turkey

The possibility of peace talks was the other important issue in archive documents. According to the archive documents, a possible peace conference between Greeks and Turks and Allies would be held "*in the near future*",

27 Bristol to Secretary of State, Papers Related... No: 767.68/245.

28 Bristol to Secretary of State, Papers Related...No: 767.68/246.

29 FO 424/254, No:123, p.94, FO 424/254, No:69, p.68, FO 424/254, No:73, p.70.

probably at Venice.³⁰ For instance, on August 17, 1922, Caffery reported that he had an interesting conversation with the British representative, F.O. Lindley. He stated that Mr. Lindley thought only the British and Greeks desired peace. According to Lindley, the Greeks desired peace for obvious reasons and the British desired peace so that normal trade relations might be established in that part of the world. Caffery also considered that Lindley thought the French did not desire peace between Greeks and the Turks for several reasons, such as:

First, they believed that it was in their interest to maintain unstable conditions all over the world until the reparation question and the question of their debts to the USA and Great Britain were settled to their liking. Second, as they realized that the Kemalist Turks would eventually be a danger to French dominion in Syria, they considered it in their interest that the Turks be weakened by all available methods, and unquestionably, a continuation of the war between the Greeks and the Turks means a weakening of the Turks, no matter who wins. According to Lindley, Italy did not desire peace because the continuation of the war means the ruin of Greece, and Italy considered that a ruined Greece would be to Italy's political advantage. The Turks also did not desire peace now because the Angora government was a war government, living by and on war.³¹

Another example of peace talks in the archive documents on August 19, 1922, was Bristol's telegram to the Secretary of State about Italy attempting to play the role of mediator of the present conflict. According to this telegram, Bristol asserted that on August 10, 1922, he addressed a communication to Angora through Djelale Dinearif (Celalleddin Arif), who was requesting, first, the minimum Turkish conditions of peace. Other issues were, second, whether Turkey was disposed to grant large concessions to minorities and willing to give adequate guarantees, third, what compensation Turks would give Allies should the latter agree to abolish capitulations, and fourth, would Turks prepared to modify zones of influence if capitulations were abolished, fifth, in case of peace, what would be relations between Sultan and present Anatolian Government; sixth, a secret clause inquiring what oil concessions will be granted to Italy in a peace settlement. Bristol stated that Angora answered that Turkey was ready to accept any terms which did not impair its national sovereignty and independence, and he underlined that the latter phrase occurred so often as to become distasteful to the Allies. In addition, he stated that in the meantime Allied High Commissioners in Istanbul were meeting frequently to attempt to arrange a preliminary conference between belligerents in some location in Western Europe.³²

30 In British archive documents, on August 12, 1922, Sir H. Rumbold sent an official telegram to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. In that telegram, Rumbold told that he and his colleagues recommended preliminary conferences should meet in Venice as soon as possible. FO 424/254, No:139, p.105.

31 Caffery to Secretary of States, Papers Related...767.68/253.

32 Bristol to Secretary of State, Papers Related...767.68/251.

2.c. House of Common Debates About Turkey-Greece War

Apart from possible peace talks and the occupation of Istanbul, there are also records of House of Commons debates about the Greco-Turk war in archive documents. Today, whether or not the British supported the Greeks is still a matter of keen debate in some circles. Some of the statements we have come across in the American archives, however, put an end to these discussions. For instance, a telegram on August 8, 1922, was sent by the counselor of the Embassy, Post Wheeler to the Secretary of State. He forwarded the statement made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on August 4, 1922, concerning the Greco-Turk imbroglio and the problems arising therefrom. He also forwarded certain newspapers clipping below, containing comments concerning the remarks made by the Prime Minister on this occasion.

On August 4, 1922, in the British parliamentary debates, Commander Kenworthy, criticized the foreign policy of the British government for the wrong decisions taken. He stated:

*"...yesterday we had the usual defense by the Prime Minister when the foreign policy of this Government is attacked, that it is not his fault that things go wrong, but the other boy's. He did not want to sign the Treaty of Versailles but M. Clemenceau insisted on it. Despite M.Clemenceau's great courage, it appears that he could not tell the French people the truth, and therefore they signed the Treaty or it was President Wilson or somebody else."*³³

Kenworthy added that Greece was not Britain's Ally in the world war, and preferred to wait until the war was over. He continued his speech as below:

*"Greece was sent to occupy Smyrna. A Committee of Inquiry, the members of which were Admiral Bristol, of the United States Navy, General Hare, of the British Army, and two very distinguished Allied generals, one Frenchman and one Italian, has described what happened there. They have made a report on what happened, the slaughtering, the excesses, and the outrages that were committed there-a report which has been suppressed. That of course roused all of Turkey. It brought thousands of men to the banner of Mustapha Kemal, and today the gentleman who is referred to occasionally by members of this government as some rebel general is the great national hero of Turkey. In addition, is looked upon as the wielder of the "Sword of the Faithful."*³⁴

Kenworthy also brought to the agenda the Armenian issue. According to him, the Armenians stood by England in the war, rose against their Turkish masters, and embarrassed the Turkish armies. To Kenworthy, this was the main reason they were massacred. He also supposed that the Christian minorities would all be massacred unless the Greeks remained where they were. He did

33 Post Wheeler to Secretary Of State, Papers Related...No: 767.68/257.

34 Post Wheeler to Secretary Of State, Papers Related...No: 767.68/257.

not talk of the Greek minorities, because they had lived there for 500 years when the Turk was supreme, and not only that, but great positions had been held by those Pontine Greeks, and the Greeks in the Vilayet of Smyrna held honorable positions until the problems caused by the intrigues of the Imperialists in Athens.

He pointed out controversy in the House; the government said that when the opposing Governments were invited to the armistice in 1922, the Greeks accepted and the Turks refused. Therefore, the Turks put themselves in the wrong, and England's support for the Greeks was justified. However, Kenworthy stated that he understood, that although The Greeks had accepted, they had armies far beyond any reasonable limits of Greek territory, and the Turks demanded that, before an armistice, the Greeks should at least begin a retreat supervised by the Allied forces. He declared that the only way to stop Greek's excesses of war was to stop the war completely. He pointed out independent reports of neutral observers, such as Arnold Toynbee, two American ladies; Miss Allen, Miss Billings, and Mr. Gehri, who wrote about villages where the Greek armies were hospitably treated, and which were burnt by the Greek armies when they returned after defeat.

"This is the signed report of those two devoted American ladies" he stated and continued:

"When the army went through here we did everything they asked us to do. We gave of our butter, our eggs, our chickens; we baked bread. However, what good did it do?

This (the ruined houses) is our reward!

...As we were about to leave the village, a group of women surrounded us, telling us about the various happenings. One said: "It was my sister-in-law who was shot when she tried to escape from the hands of the soldiers. My daughter-in-law was seized and violated. I begged the soldiers not to burn my house and their reply was: "Is not your husband Kemal's soldier? Get rights from Kemal."

He expressed that there was a generation in Turkey that was taking an interest for the first time in national matters, and they knew what they were fighting for, and he begged the Prime Minister to change his policy.

Lloyd George the Prime Minister answered Kenworthy's speech. He expressed that the Government had desired peace, too. However, he pointed out that the members of Central Hull seemed to present the case to the House of a friendly Turkey alienated by the policy of Government. He stated that *"I know it is only a few years ago since this country had such a large influence in Turkey but Member for Hull seems to forget that 8 years ago when we were engaged in a very deadly struggle with the Central Powers of Europe, when the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, and free access to the Black Sea was very vital to us, this very friendly power slammed the gates of the Dardanelles in the face of two countries without whose continuous assistance the Turkish Empire would have not been in existence. We fought one great*

war to preserve Turkey against her enemies. Before that, we had constantly intervened to protect her against those who attacked her, and as late as 1878, the whole of this country was mobilized to protect and save Turkey from the consequences of a disastrous defeat inflicted upon her by her old enemy. In August 1914, when we were engaged in a struggle of life and death, when Turkey should have assisted us without hesitation, as a result of a conspiracy which she entered into before the War with our greatest enemy, she did us the greatest dis-service any country could have done; and I have no hesitation in saying, from my knowledge of the War, and I am sure that I am confirmed in it by everybody who has ever read the history of the War, that the action taken by Turkey then had the effect of prolonging the War by probably a couple of years."

In his speech, he blamed Turkey for the complete collapse of Russia. He figured out that the reason why no aid could be sent to Russia was related entirely to Turkey's attitude. Turkey, he claimed, had been sustained for a whole century by finance, diplomatic influence, military support, and the blood of England and France. In addition, he stated that the occupation of Smyrna and the proposals of the Sevres Treaty were entirely the work of Great Britain. Kenworthy rejected Lloyd George's opinion and he claimed that Greek went to Smyrna because of alleged atrocities, which were afterward found to be false.

Lloyd George responded to critics of British government policy on the current situation in 1922, saying that the government was not responsible for the situation, and it was the report of a Commission in which the British government was only one out of five that made a recommendation. Lloyd George alleged that they did everything to keep the peace, both in London and in Paris. Nevertheless, Turkey refused the conditions, although Greece and the Istanbul Government were ready to accept. *"Mustapha Kemal may be a great general and a great patriot, but the head of Islam is in Constantinople. He is the Caliph. Mustapha Kemal refused, with the result that nothing has been accomplished. He insisted upon preliminary evacuation by the Greeks."*

Lloyd George supported his claims with *"Turkish atrocities"* in Pontus. He asserted that some deplorable outrages were made by Greek soldiers and that these were almost inevitable in that part of the world where there is war. Nevertheless, he continued his speech there had been individual cases of outrages by the Greeks in the war region, but at Pontus, there was not the slightest suggestion there was any rebellion or preparation for rebellion, not a single instance; however, tens of thousands of men, women, and children had been deported, and tens of thousands had died. While he was putting forward his claims, he showed the Report of American Mission as evidence. He said that it was pure deliberate extermination.³⁵ However, the allegations made here were biased and subjective. The massacre allegations written by American missionaries were often based on unfounded and unsubstantiated claims.³⁶

35 Post Wheeler to Secretary of State, Papers Related...767.68/257.

36 Elçin Yılmaz, *Amerikan Misyonerlerinin Türk-Ermeni İlişkilerine Etkisi*, Lambert Academic

These debates of the House of Commons on August 4, 1922, reflected in The Times newspaper on August 5, 1922, as follows:

“The Prime Minister, surveying the Near Eastern situation today, made a strongly pro-Greek pronouncement. Turkey, he claimed had done the worst disservice any country could have done to the Allies in 1914. Turkey had brought about the collapse of Russia and Rumania and had prolonged the war by about two years. This, he said was done by a power whose Empire had only been kept in existence by the blood of the sons of France and the sons of Britain.

He took the line, that Great Britain could not be accused of giving the Greeks preferential treatment because we were defending Constantinople (which otherwise could be taken by the Greeks in a few hours) and were therefore preventing an immediate decision that the Greeks could force if they were allowed to wage war at their full strength. He said that all this country wanted was just peace and that whatever happened there must be efficient and adequate protection of the minorities as an essential part of any settlement Great Britain could accept.”³⁷

Daily Telegraph also reproduced the speech of the debates in the House of Commons:

“In the House Commons, Lieut-Commander Kenworthy raised the question of British policy in the Near East, accusing the Government, in a strongly pro-Turkish speech, of having encouraged Greek Imperialism, and taken a course, which was losing our trade with the Levant and Turkey. This attack evoked a spirited reply from the Prime Minister. The Government he said had no other desire than that peace should be established, but it must be just and fair peace. Criticizing Commander Kenworthy’s picture of Turkey as a friendly Power, which had been alienated by the policy of the British Government, he recalled the shameful part played by Turkey in the war and her ingratitude to Great Britain and France-her supporters for 100 years. While admitting that deplorable atrocities had been committed by Greek soldiers, he compared with these incidents the terrible policy of extermination carried out by the Turks in Pontus.”³⁸

In the middle of August, A.S. Merrill, (naval officer), sent an important telegram to Bristol on August 1922. Bristol then stated that he had the honor to call the attention of the Department, especially to the Intelligence Report dated August 10, 1922, giving a summary of the extraordinarily complicated and confusing situation in the Near East. The report, which Bristol cited is given below:

“1. Greece is an Ally and is engaged in active warfare with Turkey. England, France, and Italy are still technically at war with Turkey but have declared their neutrality as far as the Turco- Greek war is concerned.

Publishing, 2020, pp.71-76., Nuri Karakaş, ibid, p. 272. Nuri Karakaş, *Türk-Amerikan Siyasi İlişkileri (1939-1952)*, Atatürk Kültür, Dil Ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, p.14.

37 “British Near East Policy”, *The Times*, August 5, 1922, p. 1.

38 “Turkey And Greece”, *Daily Telegraph*, August 5, 1922, p.1.

Having declared their neutrality, they permit the Greeks, a belligerent, A- to base their fleet in Constantinople, which is under the military occupation of England, France, and Italy. B- to impress Ottoman Greeks (Greeks who are Turkish subjects) into Greek Army in the Turkish Capital.

The Bolshevik Government, though not recognized by any Allied power, has a large Diplomatic Mission in Constantinople that performs the functions of Consulate-granting visas, etc.

The French mandate in Syria has not been approved. Both in Syria and Smyrna, under Greek Military Occupation, the capitulations-which we recognize as still being in force-are violated continually as regards court procedure as well as taxation.

There are two governments in Turkey, a- Mustapha Kemal at Angora, who is virtually a dictator and who has the backing of every patriotic Turk, and b- The Sultan in Constantinople, who has no following because he is considered a prisoner of war in the hands of The Allies, but who is the only recognized head of the Turkish government.

For the last two weeks the British, French, Italian and Turks have been rushing troops to the Tchaldja front, to hold Constantinople against Greek invasion.

If the Turkish forces, which are concentrating at Ismid, fifty miles southeast of Constantinople, should advance on Constantinople, would the Greek military mission here be called upon to assist the Allies in holding them back? If so, the Allies will be fighting with Turks against the Greeks in the North, and with the Greeks against the Turks in the South...³⁹

2.d. Great Attack and Liberation of Izmir

While Merrill thus summarized the situation in Anatolia in mid-August, and the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople were discussing the Greek threat to the city, Mustapha Kemal and his General Staff were watching a football match at Aksheir. This was the security cover he had chosen for a secret staff conference, to settle the date and the final arrangements for the Turkish offensive against Smyrna. The plan of the campaign had been drawn up by Kemal, Fevzi, and Ismet Pasha in secrecy nine months before. Fevzi now demonstrated it on a map, and then Kemal asked his generals for their opinion. Several were critical, less of the plan itself than on the timing of its execution. Though his commander's opposition he ordered that the armies should be ready for the offensive by the middle of August. Kemal returned to Angora and informed the ministers of his decision and his belief in its success. The cabinet agreed to the attack.

39 Merrill to Bristol, Papers Related...No: 767.68/268.

Since 6 August 1922, İsmet Pasha had been planning for Second Army to attack one day before First Army, but now Mustafa Kemal Pasha moved in favor of a simultaneous attack all along the front to begin on 26 August. Some commanders expressed reservations about the plan and going on the offensive, but Mustafa Kemal could not delay any longer for political and economic reasons. The country could not continue on a war footing for too much longer. Orders went out to the army to be in its attack positions by the night of 25 August for the offensive the next day.⁴⁰

The success of his strategical plan depended essentially on surprise. Only a few people knew of his departure for the front, and they were instructed to talk and behave as though he were still in Angora.⁴¹

On the evening of 25th August 1922, Kemal gave orders to cut all communications between Anatolia and the outside world. The first major offensive of a nation committed, for twelve years past, to defense, was about to begin.⁴² Finally, on August 26, 1922, the Turkish army began to move forward in what has come to be known to the Turks as the Great Offensive. A force spread out over 100 kilometers from Iznik to Afyon Karahisar began advancing against the enemy. The major Greek defense positions were overrun on August 26, and Izmit fell the same day.⁴³ On August 30, the Greek army was defeated at Dumlupınar, with half of its soldiers captured or slain, and its equipment entirely lost. As thousands of Greek soldiers fled toward Izmir, on September 1 Mustafa Kemal issued his most famous order to the Turkish army: "Armies, your first goal is the Mediterranean-Forward!"⁴⁴ According to Andrew Mango, Mustafa Kemal's lightning military victory had been the fruit of more than two years of prudent political activity, and the Greeks were defeated in Anatolia, the result of political miscalculation based on little more than wishful thinking.⁴⁵ In connection with Mango's view, Rıdvan Akın emphasized that this victory was the result of the bad management of the Greek army and the incompetence of General Hacıanesti, as much as the military genius of the Turkish commander.⁴⁶

On September 2, 1922, Turkish armies captured Eskişehir, and the Greek government asked Britain to arrange an armistice that would preserve its rule in Izmir at least. Balıkesir was taken on September 6, and Aydın and Manisa the next day, the latter burned by the Greeks before their departure. The government in Athens resigned. Two days later the Turkish cavalry charged into Izmir to the

40 George W. Gawrych, *The Young Turk*, I.B. Tauris, London-New York, 2013, pp.193-194.

41 Kinross, *ibid*, pp.305-309.

42 Kinross, *ibid*, p. 311.

43 See; Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, *Türk İstiklal Harbi Batı Cephesi, Büyük Taarruz (1-31 August 1922)*, Vol:2, Part 6, Genel Kurmay Publication, Ankara, 1995, pp.95-121.

44 Stanford J.Shaw, Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of The Ottoman Empire And Modern Turkey*, Volume II, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1977, p.362.

45 Andrew Mango, *The Biography Of The Founder Of Modern Turkey*, The Overlook Press, New York, 1999, p.125.

46 Rıdvan Akın, *Türk Siyasal Tarihi (1908-2000)*, On iki Levha Press, İstanbul, 2009, p.208.

cheers of thousands. Bursa was taken on September 10. The next day Kemal's forces headed for the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, where British, French, and Italian soldiers from Istanbul reinforced the Allied garrisons. Thousands of Greek soldiers and peasants flooded into Izmir from all over Anatolia and were loaded onto Allied transport ships for shipment back to Greece. The civil government in Izmir was now back in Turkish hands. On September 13, 1922, a fire broke out in the Armenian quarter of the city. It spread rapidly and the Turkish army's efforts to extinguish it were stymied by the discovery that all the city's fire hoses had been cut and the fire cisterns emptied. In a single day, as many as 25,000 buildings were burned and half the great city destroyed. Perhaps the last atrocity of the war was the suggestion, quickly taken up by the Western Press, that the victorious Turkish army was responsible for burning the conquered second city of the old empire. Culpability has never been proved.⁴⁷

To see how these developments are reflected in the American archives, we should look at the telegram signed by Bristol on 28 August 1922. Bristol expressed that all Anatolia frontiers and ports were closed to communications, and also all mail and telegraph services, both foreign and Turkish. Besides, he predicted that the main attack would be on the Eskişehir front, where Turks had seven divisions on the front line and two in reserve.⁴⁸ On the same day, Caffery claimed that the Turkish surprise attack and advance in Asia Minor during the last few days had caused considerable depression in Greece, and the Government was criticized for sending too many troops from Asia Minor to participate in a futile move against Constantinople.⁴⁹ On August 30, 1922, it was reported that a serious attack by the Turks was continuing at Afion Karahisar, a strategic point that was taken to prevent the moving of Greek reinforcements from Thrace by rail to the battle area, and that the Turks had advanced along the Casaba Railroad seventy kilometers.⁵⁰

On September 2, 1922, Horton (The Consul General at Smyrna) summarized the situation of the battle as below:

“Military situation is so worse. Ushak and the other cities were evacuated and burned on 1 September 1922. The First Greek army corps badly demoralized had retired to a position west of Ushak. It had been joined by the second army corps which narrowly escaped by making a wide detour. The third army corps was at Eskişehir but would probably soon evacuated, and so burned the town. The situation was so serious that it could not be saved. Panic was spreading among the Christian population, foreigners as well as Greeks, and many were trying to leave. When the demoralized Greek army reaches Smyrna, serious trouble is more than possible and threats to burn the town are frequently heard.”⁵¹

47 Shaw, *ibid*, p.363.

48 Bristol to Secretary of State, Papers Related..., No: 767.68/262.

49 Caffery to Secretary of State, Papers Related..., No: 767.68/264.

50 Horton to Secretary of State, Papers Related...No: 767.68/265.

51 Horton to Secretary of State, Papers Related... No:767.68/274.

Caffery informed the Secretary of State on September 4, 1922, about the Asia Minor Commander in Chief being blamed by the Government for being unready for the Turkish offensive and stated that he was to be removed, and General Tripouki had been recommended to replace him.⁵²

On September 5, 1922, America Consulate decided to send one or more destroyers to Smyrna to assist in the care of American lives and property.⁵³

On September 6, 1922, the White House sent a remarkable telegram to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State was informed about the situation in Anatolia and the Greek army. It stated that the Greek army had been completely routed and was burning and massacring in its retreat.⁵⁴

On September 7, 1922, Caffery informed the Secretary of State that General Tricoupis appointed Commander-in-chief was captured by Turks and also he stated that the Greek Government desired to evacuate Asia Minor as soon as possible but was apprehensive of trouble with the arrival of returning troops and refugees.⁵⁵

On September 8, 1922, Horton asked the Secretary of State about his relations, if any, with the Kemalist military or civil authorities.⁵⁶ The department answered the Consul's question below:

*"You will bear in mind that your Government recognizes the existing regime neither in Greece nor in Asia Minor and that diplomatic relations with the Sublime Ports have not been resumed. Nevertheless, for political reasons it will be advantageous for you to remain unofficially at your post as an American consul without exequatur (recognition) and as a delegate of the High Commissioner at Constantinople. If difficulties arise report to the Department"*⁵⁷

On September 9, 1922, Turkish armies recaptured Izmir. Turkish cavalry charged into Izmir to the cheers of thousands. Thousands of Greek soldiers and peasants flooded into Izmir from all over Anatolia and were loaded on Allied transport ships for shipment back to Greece. The civil government of Izmir was now back in Turkish hands, and desperate efforts were made to keep order and prevent looting.⁵⁸

On September 9, 1922, Bristol wrote a telegram to the Secretary of State. He stated, *"Smyrna situation is most alarming. Greek troops in panic poured into the city. Population feared violence between the time Greek troops were ordered to evacuate and temporary arrangements of Turks. Repeated threats by Greek officers to*

52 Caffery to Secretary of State, Papers Related... No: 767.68/275.

53 Izmir American Embassy to Secretary of State, Papers Related...No: 767.68/274.

54 White House to Secretary of State, Papers Related...No: 767.68/291.

55 Caffery to Secretary of State, Papers Related..., No: 767.68/294.

56 Horton to Secretary of State, Papers Related..., No: 767.68/296.

57 Secretary of State to Horton, Papers Related..., No: 767.68/297.

58 Shaw, *ibid*, p.363, Fahri Belen, *Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı*, Yeditepe Publication, İstanbul, 2014, p.488.

burn the town. Aidin and Nazilli already burned. On September 6th American, English, French and Italian consuls telegraphed Greek Minister of War, Theotokis, asking for assurances Smyrna would not be burned or pillaged. Theotokis replied he could give no such assurances. Greek fleet left Smyrna Friday afternoon. Greek administration of the city ceased at 10 pm Friday and Allies took over the city. In addition, he claimed that Allied consuls would meet Mustapha Kemal at Casaba the same day with the telegram to arrange for the surrender of Smyrna.

...He confirmed that the British were withdrawing women and children. Three United States destroyers at Smyrna. Furthermore, reports from Mudania indicated the possibility of Broussa burning and Greek evacuation being extremely likely."⁵⁹

On September 10, 1922, General Kazım Pasha, Izmir Commander, declared an official announcement noting that the Turkish National Assembly's armies recaptured Izmir and the Greeks laws were completely abolished. According to the announcement, officers and soldiers belonging to the Greek army would immediately surrender to the command in the region where they were located. No one would be allowed to break the law for excitement or revenge. Those who acted, on the contrary, would be punished. No one should carry or fire a gun.⁶⁰

Finally, on September 10, 1922, Bristol confirmed the latest reports from Smyrna regarding the attitude of good order and discipline of Turkish troops entering the city, and Mustafa Kemal published a proclamation sentencing to death any Turkish soldier molesting non-combatants.⁶¹

While the process leading to the liberation of İzmir was conveyed in this way in the American archival documents, the American press also conveyed the issue to the public. For example, The New York Times stated that the Turkish army corps arrived in Izmir and took control of the city. In addition, they stopped the Greek destruction.⁶²

The Great Attack ended in great victory. Militarily, the Great Attack was a complete success. It was brilliantly planned and heroically executed. The victory was total and overwhelming. The enemy was devastated and thrown into the sea. All the calculations of the Greek army were turned upside down, and those who saw the Turkish army as weak were seen to be mistaken. As the Greeks fled, their villages were destroyed. According to Şimşir, English documents on this subject are many.⁶³

59 Bristol to Secretary of State, Papers Related..., No: 767.68/297.

60 *Askeri Tarih Belgeleri Journal*, Ankara Genel Kurmay Publication, Vol:151, Ankara, 2008, p. 101.

61 Bristol to Secretary of State, Papers Related..., No: 767.68/300.

62 "Smyrna Welcomes Kemal Pasha's Entry", *The New York Times*, September 12, 1922, p. 3., "Greek Surrender Smyrna To Turks After Shell Fire", **The New York Times**, September 10, 1922, p. 1, "Turks Take Smyrna", *The Washington Post*, September 10, 1922, p. 1.

63 Bilal Şimşir, *İngiliz Belgeleri İle Sakarya'dan İzmir'e (1921-1922)*, Bilgi Publication, Ankara, 1989, pp.393-395.

The Turkish Army, commanded by Commander-in-Chief Mustafa Kemal Pasha, had succeeded in reaching Izmir, but the struggle was not over yet. After that, all efforts and attention were directed to Istanbul and the Bosphorus.

Conclusion

There were differences between the perspective of the USA and the Allies regarding the Eastern question. While the Allies wanted to reshape the Middle East and created spheres of influence, shared out among themselves in the secret agreements they signed during the war; the USA was against these secret agreements from the very beginning. She rejected the economic spheres of influence, instead demanding the application of the principle of national self-determination, and the application of the "Open Door" principle, which would eliminate the spheres of influence, allowing instead free competition.

At the beginning of the National Struggle, the Turkish-American political relationship was not similar to the relations of England, France, and Italy with Turkey. These imperialist states were able to extract many benefits from the Ottoman lands. Before the war and after, they concluded some important secret agreements about the partition of Turkey. President Wilson initially did not want to recognize these treaties, nor did the USA have any territorial claims in the Middle East. The USA only wanted to preserve the religious and cultural institutions in this region.

During 1921 and 1922, the USA continued its policy of monitoring developments in Turkey from afar. Admiral Bristol informed her about Turkey during these years. The USA did not remain indifferent to the National Movement being organized in Anatolia. However, Washington did not clarify its stance on the relations to be established with Ankara until after the Battle of Sakaria, when it sent a representative to Ankara, albeit semi-officially. First, Julian Gillespie was sent to Ankara in December 1921 then in 1922, Robert Imbrie was sent as a representative. America tried to get closer to Turkey to support its commercial interests. On the other hand, Ankara's intention to contact Washington was to avoid the political loneliness in the face of the European alliance. On the one hand, it used the sincere relations established with Bolshevik Russia to intimidate Europe, while on the other; it planned to win America as an ally.

Turkey insisted that its political and economic independence should be recognized and the capitulations abolished. For instance, Gillespie met with Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Rauf Bey. According to Gillespie, the Turkish government was in favor of Americans helping Turkey's economic development and were happy to allow American capital into the country but they insisted on national independence.

While trying to protect its economic interests in Turkey, America was following the developments in Anatolia day by day through its diplomats. Horton in Izmir, Caffery in Greece, Bristol in Istanbul, and Harvey in London informed the USA Secretary Of State about the Greco-Turkish war. In American archives, especially in August and September, preoccupation claims of Istanbul by Greeks, House of Commons debates between Lloyd George and Kenworthy, possible peace talks, and the Great Attack were emphasized. Regarding claims of the preoccupation of Istanbul, American diplomats alleged that the Allies were not confirming such kind of occupation and they ordered their armies to prevent that occupation. On the other hand, there was talk of possible Greek-Turkish peace talks in Venice. This shows us how Mustapha Kemal Pasha and the other commanders were successful to hide Great Attack preparations. The House of Commons debates were also reflected in the archives. When we look at the discussions, we can easily understand that Lloyd George accused Turkey of continuing the war. While the Sultan in Istanbul accepted the terms of peace, the National Government in Ankara refused the peace. However, we have to underline that Mustafa Kemal Pasha and the National Government in Ankara wanted peace in Turkey more than anyone else did, without compromising full independence. It was just a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres, where Lloyd George and people like him talked about the terms of peace. In addition, these conditions were opposed to the principle of full independence.

The issue that has drawn our attention most in the American archives is the statement that one of the issues that attracted our attention most was Theotokis's statement that he could not promise that İzmir would not be burned during the withdrawal of the Greek soldiers from İzmir. In addition, Bristol stated that Turkish troops entered the city in discipline and no atrocities happened while and after they entered the city and Turkish Generals and Vali of Izmir took all measures.

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Genişletilmiş Özet

19 Mayıs 1919 tarihinde başlayan Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı 3 yılı aşkın bir süre devam etmiş ve 9 Eylül 1922 tarihinde İzmir'in düşman işgalinden kurtarılmasıyla son bulmuştur. Üç büyük cephede topyekun verilen büyük bir mücadele sonrası kazanılan zafer, kurulacak olan yeni devletin de temellerini atmıştır. Mustafa Kemal Paşa önderliğinde yürütülen bağımsızlık savaşında kesin bir zafer elde etmek amacıyla askeri ve diplomatik mücadele eş zamanlı olarak sürdürülmüştür. Bu süreç, hem Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin uluslararası alanda kendini kabul ettirme hem de bir ulus olarak varlığına son vermek isteyenlere karşı Türk Milleti'nin var oluş mücadelesi olmuştur.

Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı esnasında Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve 23 Nisan 1920'de Ankara'da kurulan Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin en önemli hedefi milli bağımsızlık ilkesi çerçevesinde ilan edilen Misak-ı Milli'nin Doğu'da ve Batı'da tüm devletler nezdinde kabul edilmesini sağlamak, Türkiye'nin varlığını uluslararası konjonktürde kabul ettirmek ve aynı zamanda Kurtuluş Savaşı'nı başarıyla sonuçlandırmak için gerekli desteği alabileceği ülkelerle anlaşmalar yaparak askeri ve maddi olanaklarını genişletmek olmuştur. Bu politika milliyetçi liderler tarafından oldukça zor koşullarda gerçekleştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bir yandan Anadolu ve Trakya'nın hemen hemen bütün topraklarını işgal etmiş İngiltere, Fransa gibi Batılı devletlerle cephe savaşları yürütülürken, diğer yandan Türkiye'nin haksız bir şekilde işgal edildiği dünya kamuoyuna duyurulmaya çalışılmıştır. Her fırsatta savaşın durmasının koşullarını dile getiren Mustafa Kemal Paşa, barışa her zaman hazır olduklarını ama ne olursa olsun siyasi ve askeri bağımsızlıklarından vazgeçmeyeceklerini önemle dile getirmiştir. Olası barış görüşmelerine her zaman açık olduklarını, ancak tek şartlarının kapitülasyonların kaldırılması ve işgallerin sona ermesi olarak belirtmiştir.

İşgallerin sona erdirilmesi için İngiltere ve Fransa ile bir yandan müzakereler yapılırken bir diğer yandan da Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile diplomatik temaslar kurulmaya çalışılmıştır. Amerika'nın çeşitli dönemlerde Türkiye'ye gönderdiği heyetler, yarı-resmi ve resmi devlet adamları Türkiye'nin mücadelesinin uluslararası kamuoyunda tanıtılmasında önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Amerika'dan gönderilen heyetlerle en önemli devlet adamları nezdinde görüşmeler gerçekleşmiş, Türkiye'nin en önemli konularda talepleri bu görüşmelerde dile getirilmiştir.

Örneğin, Sivas Kongresi'nin gerçekleştiği günlerde, General James Harbord ve heyeti Türkiye'ye gelmiştir. Mustafa Kemal Paşa, Harbord ve heyetinin Ermeni sorunu çerçevesinde inceleme yapmak üzere Türkiye'ye gelmesini Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın haklılığını ortaya koymak açısından çok önemsemiş ve bir Amerikan resmi temsilcisine Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın gerekçelerini anlatmak üzere bu ziyareti fırsat bilerek değerlendirmiştir. 22 Eylül 1919 tarihinde General Harbord, Sivas'ta Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile görüşmüştür. Bu görüşmede Mustafa Kemal Paşa, General Harbord'a Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın nitelik ve amaçlarını anlatmış ve bu doğrultuda onun anlayışını kazanmıştır. Mustafa Kemal'in Amerika ile temas etme gereği duymasının en önemli sebeplerinden biri, İngiltere, Fransa ve İtalya'nın kurduğu bloğa karşı Wilson'ın Milliyetler İlkesi vasıtasıyla Amerika'yı Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın yanına çekmek ve böylece siyasi yalnızlıktan Türkiye'yi kurtarmaktır.

Bu doğrultuda Ankara Hükümeti'nin Amerika ile "resmi" ilişki kurmak için ilk girişimi 1921 Ocak ayında olmuştur. Bu tarihte, Amerika'nın İstanbul'daki Yüksek Komiseri Amiral Bristol nezdinde yapılan girişimde Ankara Hükümeti ile Amerika arasında "dostane" ilişkilerin tekrar kurulması arzusu belirtilmiş ise de bu girişim sonuçsuz kalmıştır. Büyük Millet Meclisi ve Fransa arasında Sakarya Savaşı'ndan sonra imzalanan Ankara Antlaşması, Amiral Bristol'u ülkesine karşı bir kez daha harekete geçirmiştir. İstanbul'daki Amerikan Yüksek Komiseri Amiral Bristol, Amerikan yönetimini, Mustafa Kemal ve Ankara Hükümeti'ni resmen tanımak konusunda kaygıya düşmeme konusunda uyarmıştır. Ankara Hükümeti'nin ülkenin çoğunluğunu yönettiğini, ve aynı zamanda halkın çoğunluğu tarafından desteklendiğini belirtmiştir. Amiral Bristol'un, Ankara Hükümeti ile temas kurulmasında ısrar etmesi sonucu, Amerikan Hükümeti, İstanbul'daki Amerikan Ticaret Temsilciliği'nden Julian Gillespie'yi geçici olarak Ankara'ya göndermiştir. Gillespie 1921 Aralık ayında Ankara'ya gelmiş ve 1922 Şubat'ında Ankara'dan ayrılmıştır. Gillespie, Ankara'da bulunduğu süre içerisinde Rauf (Orbay) Bey ile görüşmüştür.

Amerika 1922 Haziran'ında, diplomat Robert W. Imbrie'yi Ankara'ya göndermiştir. Imbrie'nin gönderileceği Ankara'ya bildirildiği zaman, Ankara Hükümeti şart olarak, kendisinin resmen tanınması ve Ankara Hükümeti'nin de buna karşılık Washington'a bir temsilci göndermesini ileri sürmüş ancak Amerika bu şartı kabul etmemiştir. Türkiye bu şartlarında ısrarcı olmamış, Amerika ile iyi ilişkiler kurmak için Imbrie'nin Ankara'ya girişine izin vermiştir. Imbrie Ankara'ya vardığında burada yayınlanan ve Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı'nın halka aktarılması amacıyla faaliyet gösteren Hakimiyet-i Milliye gazetesine bir demeç vermiş ve Amerikalıların Türkiye'ye olan dostça duygularını dile getirirken, kendi duygularının da Türklerden yana olduğunu açıklamıştır. Böylece Mustafa Kemal ve Büyük Millet Meclisi Yunanlara karşı önemli bir diplomatik başarı daha elde etmiştir.

Büyük Taarruz ve Başkomutanlık Meydan Muharebesi ve hemen sonrasında İzmir'in kurtuluşuna giden süreçte Amerikan Dış İşleri Bakanlığı Türkiye'deki Amerikan temsilciler aracılığıyla Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndaki gelişmeleri gün gün takip etmiş ve bu doğrultuda Ankara Hükümeti'ne karşı politikasını daha net ve kesin bir çizgiye oturtmuştur. İzmir'de Horton, Yunanistan'da Caffery, İstanbul'da Bristol ve Londra'da Harvey, Amerikan Dış İşleri Bakanlığı'nı Türk-Yunan Savaşı hakkında bilgilendirmiştir.

Özellikle çalışmamızın kapsamını belirleyen Ağustos ve Eylül 1922 tarihleri arasında Amerikan Birleşik Devletleri ulusal arşiv belgelerinde diplomatik yazışmalara konu olan başlıklar, İstanbul'un Yunanlar tarafından işgali iddiaları, İngiliz Avam Kamarası'nda özellikle Kenworthy ve Lloyd George arasındaki Türk-Yunan Savaşı ile ilgili tartışmalar, Yunanistan ve Türkiye arasında yapılabilecek arabuluculuk çalışmaları, Büyük Taarruz ve İzmir'in Türk ordusu tarafından yeniden ele geçirilmesi çerçevesinde şekillenmiştir. Çalışmamızda bu başlıkların Amerikan arşiv belgelerine nasıl yansıdığı ayrıntılı bir şekilde ele alınmıştır. Örneğin, Amerikalı diplomatlar, İstanbul'un Yunanlar tarafından işgal edileceği iddialarına ilişkin olarak, Müttefiklerin bu tür bir işgali onaylamadıklarını ve ordularına bu işgali önleme emri verdiklerini belirtmişlerdir. Öte yandan Ağustos ayında, Venedik'te olası bir Yunan-Türk barış görüşmesinden belgelerde sıkça söz edilmiş, bu da bize Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve diğer komutanların Büyük Taarruz hazırlıklarının düşmandan gizlenmesinde ne kadar başarılı olduklarını göstermektedir. İzmir'e Türk ordularının girmesiyle birlikte disiplinli bir şehir yönetimi oluşturulduğu, Rum ve Ermenilere karşı herhangi bir taşkınlık yapılmaması için Ankara Hükümeti tarafından gerekli önlemler alındığı da belgelerde ifade edilmiştir.

Ulusal arşiv belgelerine yansıyan İngiliz Avam Kamarası tartışmalarında da özellikle dikkatimizi çeken Lloyd George'un Türkiye'yi savaşı sürdürmekle suçlamasıdır. "İstanbul'daki padişah barış şartlarını kabul ederken, Ankara'daki Milli Hükümet barışı reddetti" diyerek Ankara Hükümeti'nin uzlaşmaz tavrından şikayet etmektedir. Oysa ki, Lloyd George'un barış derken kastettiği Sevr Antlaşması'nın revizyonundan ibaret iken Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve Ankara Hükümeti'nin talebi tam bağımsız bir devlet olarak yaşamının şartlarının yeni baştan oluşturulmasıydı.

Tamamen özgün Amerikan ulusal arşiv belgelerine dayalı bu çalışmamızda Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin İzmir'in kurtuluşuna giden süreçteki diplomatik tutumunu detaylı bir şekilde ele aldık. Karşılaştırma ve burada geçen bilgileri daha detaylı incelememiz gerektiğinde ise İngiliz Ulusal Arşiv belgelerinden ve bazı Amerikan ve İngiliz gazetelerinden de çalışmamızda faydalandık.