

**THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION
IN THE 1964 CYPRUS CRISIS
AND THE GREEK POLITICAL REACTION
(FEBRUARY-AUGUST 1964)***

Gurhan YELLICE**

Abstract

This work is about the American intervention in the 1964 Cyprus Crisis. In particular, the study concentrates on the Greek political reaction to the US mediation efforts during the crisis. The process that brought about the first US involvement in the crisis started in November 1963, when Makarios sought to change the constitution in order to centralize the government. This move soon led a civil war on the island and after the war, the guarantor powers got involved. Believing Makarios' "independent" actions on the island were a threat to "peace" in the Mediterranean. The primary objective of the US was to avoid a war between Turkey and Greece and to secure the *Natofication* of the island. Both Turkey and Greece accepted the elimination of Makarios but disagreed on how to achieve it: "Enosis or Enosis with compensation to Turkey". Turkey wanted the second option while Greece insisted on the first. Makarios, on the other hand, achieved the internationalization of the crisis by demanding help from Soviets. Under Cold War conditions, the Johnson administration, believing that the second option was the best solution for the interests of all the parties, tried very hard to find the silver lining between the parties however, they failed to convince the Papandreou government in Greece. By examining this historical process, it is proposed to analyze the parameters that led Greece to not accept the US proposals to come to an agreement with Turkey. This will help reveal why the Cyprus issue remained unresolved in 1964, results of which affected 1967 and 1974 Crises and still affects the current deadlock.

Keywords: Cyprus Crisis of 1964, the US Intervention, Greece, Turkey, Enosis, Natofication.

**AMERIKA'NIN 1964 KIBRIS KRIZI'NE MÜDAHALESİ
VE YUNANISTAN'IN TEPKİSİ
(ŞUBAT-AĞUSTOS 1964)**

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** Dr., Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü.
(gurhan.yellice@deu.edu.tr).

Öz

1964 Kıbrıs Krizi'ne Amerika'nın müdahalesini konu edinen bu çalışma, bu süreçte Amerika'nın arabuluculuk faaliyetlerine yönelik Yunanistan'ın tepkisini incelemeyi amaçlar. Amerika'nın Kıbrıs krizine müdahil olmasına giden süreç 1963 yılı sonunda Makarios'un Kıbrıs'ta Türk-Rum ortaklığına dayalı Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'ni Rum egemenliğine almak amacıyla anayasada değişiklik yapmak istemesiyle başladı. Makarios'un bu girişimi adada bir iç savaşa ve ardından da garantör ülkelerin müdahalesine yol açtı. Makarios'un Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasındaki ilişkileri geren "bağımsız eylemlerinin" Akdeniz'deki "barışı" tehdit ettiği sonucuna varan Amerika, krize dâhil olarak Türkiye ve Yunanistan arasında çıkması muhtemel bir savaşa engel olma ve adayı NATO şemsiyesi altına getirmeyi amaçladı. Kıbrıs'ta Makarios'u ortadan kaldırmayı amaçlayan Papandreou Hükümeti ve Ankara'da İnönü Hükümeti bu konuda Amerika ile aynı görüşteydi. Ancak temel uzlaşmazlık bunun nasıl gerçekleştirileceği konusundaydı: Enosis mi yoksa Enosis karşılığında Türkiye'ye bir taviz vererek mi? Yunanistan birinci Türkiye ikinci seçenekte diretti. Bu süreçte Makarios'un sorunu BM gündemine taşınması ve Sovyetlerin desteğine başvurması üzerine kriz uluslararası bir niteliğe dönüştü ve giderek içinden çıkılmaz bir hal almaya başladı. Soğuk Savaş koşullarında adanın yeni bir Küba'ya dönüşmesi endişesi taşıyan, bu nedenle ikinci seçeneğin taraflar açısından en iyi seçim olduğuna inanan Amerika, İki ülke arasında bir uzlaşma sağlayabilmek için oldukça yoğun bir çaba sarf etti. Ancak Yunanistan'da Papandreou hükümeti tüm girişimlere rağmen ikna edilemedi. Özellikle Amerika'nın krize aktif olarak dahil olduğu Şubat 1964'ten sürecin başarısızlıkla sonuçlandığı Ağustos 1964'e kadar olan tarihsel süreci mercek altına alan bu çalışma, Yunanistan'ın Amerikan önerilerine yönelik olumsuz tutumunun nedenlerini ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir. Altı aylık bu kritik sürecin anlaşılması, yalnızca sorunun 1964 yılında neden çözümsüz kaldığını değil aynı zamanda 1967, 1974 krizlerinin hatta günümüzde devan eden çözümsüzlüğün anlaşılmasını kolaylaştıracaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: 1964 Kıbrıs Krizi, Amerikan müdahalesi, Yunanistan, Turkey, Enosis, Natofication.

Introduction: Background to the 1964 Cyprus Crisis

Cyprus has had many rulers throughout its history: Assyrian, Egyptian, Persian, Greek and Roman but during these foreign occupations, the Greek character of the island always remained. It was with the Ottoman rule that Turks settled on the island. In 1878, the Ottoman Empire ceded the island to Britain. The island was annexed by Britain after Turkey entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers. In 1923, with the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey accepted that officially the island was British. In 1925, Britain declared the island as a Crown Colony. When British rule began, the Enosis supporters saw this as a great opportunity for its unification with Greece This desire became so strong in 1931 that most Greek Cypriots revolted against the British rule. Having managed to

suppress the revolt, Britain ruled the island with absolute control until the end of the Second World War. Following the war, the demands for Enosis resumed. In 1950, the leader of the Church, Makarios organized an unofficial plebiscite, the results of which showed that 96% were in favor of the unification. In order to take the issue to the UN Security Council, Makarios also asked Greece for help. But, economically dependent on Britain, Greece chose to remain silent to his demands¹. In response to Makarios' efforts Britain, which did not want to transfer political responsibility proposed series of constitutional arrangements to provide 'limited self government' over the island's internal affairs. Each time Britain substantially expanded the degree of that self-government, autonomy became an even more distant ideal. But the entire scheme assumed the maintenance of British sovereignty, at least within the foreseeable future². In 1954, Greece changed its attitude towards the island³ and decided to take the issue to the UN. Thus, having begun as an anti-colonial struggle of the Greek Cypriots against British rule, the Cyprus question first came to international attention in 1954. From 1954-1958, the issue was would be discussed many times at the UN⁴.

Following this, Turkey started to get involved in the Cyprus issue. In response to Enosis that demanded to pave the way for deterioration of the relations between the two ethnic groups in the island, Turkey adopted the *Taksim* (Partition) policy. Greece and Turkey soon became entangled and this evolved into a conflict between Turkey, Greece and the UK which threatened both the stability of NATO and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean region. The hostile feelings were so great that the end of 1950's brought the first two countries to the brink of war. At the end of 1958, the general picture on the island was that: the Turkish and Greek communities were poles apart. EOKA and TMT were fighting⁵. Relations between Turkey and Greece were in a deadlock. Greece would accept no settlement which excluded the possibility of Enosis while

1 Michael Attalides, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, Q Press, Edinburg, 1978, pp.59-60.

2 The main reason for this was that British had forced out Suez canal base under the terms of 1954 and Britain had to move the Middle East quarter to Cyprus. Therefore the strategic importance of the island for the Britain was gaining importance. See Halil Ibrahim Salih, *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*, University of Alabama Press Montgomery, 1978.

3 The Greek diplomat Dimitri Bitsios argued that "Greek government launched its campaign for enlightenment. Dimitri S. Bitsios, *Cyprus: The Vulnerable Republic*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1975, p.22.

4 Stephen G. Xydis, *Cyprus, Conflict and Conciliation: 1954-1958*, Ohio University Press, Columbus, Ohio, 1968

5 For detailed analysis about TMT, see, Aydın Akkurt, *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilâtı 1957-1958 Mücadelesi*, Bayrak Matbaacılık, İstanbul, 1999; Ulvi Keser, *Kıbrıs'ta Yeraltı Faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (1950-1963)*, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul 2007. For EOKA see, George Grivas, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, ed. Charles Foley, London, 1964; Doros Alastos,, *Cyprus Guerrilla: Grivas, Makarios and the British*, William Heinemann Ltd, London, 1960.

Turkey would not agree to Enosis at any price⁶. The deadlock on the island was definite. Britain was unhappy about the indeciveness and the disarray on the island since its bases were in danger. The US, on the other hand, as leader of the western block, was worried about the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and NATO. The United States was concerned over the mounting Greek-Turkish tensions which threatened to paralyze the southeastern flank of the Western alliance⁷. The conflict between the two countries was of great concern to the US since both Turkey and Greece were crucial to NATO; a war between these two sides could cause the collapse of NATO's southeastern flank, threaten the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and pave the way for the Soviets to get involved and take advantage of the situation. Under the conditions of Cold War, this was unacceptable.

Believing that the Cyprus Question had "unnecessarily" worsened their relations, Karamanlis and Menderes, decided to negotiate to end the conflict. Talks were conducted in Zurich late 1958 and then with the British in attendance in London in early 1959. Given their pressing need to find a solution, all three parties did come to an agreement on Cypriot independence in the Zurich and London Agreements. Britain "sacrificed" its sovereignty (although it kept two sovereign bases), Greece its *Enosis*, and Turkey its *Taksim* while keeping their rights as warrantors intact. Consequently, the tension between the parties appeared to have faded and, as far as the US was concerned, a crisis that would have become international had been averted. Based on these agreements Cyprus officially became an "independent state" in 1960. According to the constitution, the island was to be governed jointly by the two ethnic groups, with a Greek President and a Turkish Vice President. The constitution, which definitely ruled out Enosis and Partition, provided for territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Cyprus. It made London, Athens and Ankara co-guarantors of its stability. The Treaty of Guarantee provided all three powers the right to unilaterally interfere in order to secure the rights of Cypriots.

However, the Republic of Cyprus, which was considered a diplomatic success for the guarantor powers, did not exactly satisfy the Enosis supporters or Archbishop Makarios, the heart and the soul of the Enosis movement. He had been a reluctant signatory to the agreements and had never believed in partnership with the Turks⁸. In his point of view, the Turks were just a minority and they should not have been given so much power. In 1959, he had no choice

6 C.M. Woodhouse, *Modern Greece: A Short History*, Faber and Faber, Second Edition, London 1977, p.273-27; Fahir Armaoğlu, *20.yıy Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1980*, Tisa Matbaası, Ankara, 1988, p.478-479.

7 Joseph S. Joseph, "Post Colonial Period, 1960-1974: Expectations and Failures", Ed. Michalis, S. Michael and Anastasios M. Tamis, Vantias, p.29.

8 According to Kissinger "Makarios did not have heart in it, and with independence he systematically reneged on what he had promised, seeking to create in effect a unitary state in which the Turkish minority would always be outvoted". See Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, George Weidenfeld&Nicolson Press, London, 1982, p.1189.

but to sign the agreements, otherwise there would have been a risk of the partition of the island. Having signed the agreements with the secret idea in his mind that he would change them when the international atmosphere was suitable, Makarios saw them as a step towards Enosis. In every speech he made he mentioned the “temporariness” of the settlement and promised that enosis would be achieved soon. On 1 August 1963 in an interview to the *Athens News Agency*, he said: “The struggle of EOKA was of course a struggle for union of Cyprus with Greece. This feeling has not been uprooted from the hearts of Greek-Cypriots. There is, however, a difference between what is desirable and what may be achieved. I still believe I did well to sign agreements. In view of the then prevailing conditions it was not possible achieve a better solution”⁹.

As Soulioti, the Minister of Justice at that time later stated, ‘Makarios’ claim was that this medicine is useless, we must change it. We want a more drastic remedy. The remedy now was this: amputation of Turkish rights. According to her, the real cause of friction was that there was no desire on the Greek side to run and share the government with the Turks. She argues that, “the friction was not emanating from or as a consequence of difficulties created by certain constitutional provisions but from the persistent refusal of the Greeks to implement or observe the constitutional provisions; from the refusal of the Greeks to recognize the Turks as their brothers and partners in the common cause of the welfare and betterment of the state; from the persistence of the Greeks to dominate absolutely over the Turks, treat them as second hand citizens and low-down creatures in a way incomprehensible by ordinary civilized person; from the persistence of most responsible officers of the Republic to look upon the regime “as a bastion for further campaigns” and from the persistence by certain responsible elements ‘to complete the unfinished victor’ etc. As she put it very correctly: “No will, no way”¹⁰.

Soon, the friction between the two communities had been fostered by a general lack of sincere desire on the Greek side to collaborate with the Turks in a spirit of good-will and understanding. Therefore before long, disputes arose on the functioning of the state and it became very clear that it was impossible to resolve them by consensus. A series of deadlocks came into view such as state budgets, taxation, municipalities among others¹¹. At that point, on 30 November

9 TNA: FO 371/168988, Nicosia to Athens, Telegram No.586, 1 August 1963. Greek Cypriot author Vanezis, agrees that Makarios never believed the republic and the partnership: “Yet, paradoxically enough, in Cyprus the victory against British colonialism was a hollow one. As events turned out the enemy of self determination in Cyprus was not Britain but Turkish interference to which Britain gave every encouragement. It was not given to Makarios to rest after his labours. The end of British rule in Cyprus was not the end of the struggle against colonialism as many people thought. On the contrary, it was the beginning of a new and a more bitter struggle centered around the new Republic which was about to be created on the island”. P.N. Vanezis, *Makarios Life and Leadership*, Aberlard-Schuman, London, 1979, p.48.

10 Stella Soulioti, *Fettered Independence*, Minnesota: MEEM, 2006, p.693.

11 Diana Weston Markides, *Cyprus 1957-1963 From Colonial Conflict to Constitutional Crisis*,

1963, President Makarios, claiming that the constitution was unworkable, proposed to revise it in favor of the Greek Cypriots¹². Taking the proposals as a step to achieve *Enosis*, Turkish and the Turkish Cypriots rejected it firmly¹³. Rapidly thereafter, national sentiments arose, relations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots deteriorated quickly and the atmosphere on the island became tenser and more volatile than ever. According to the British Intelligence report, the paramilitary organizations of both communities were preparing for a conflict:

“We have received a mass of evidence, some, the most significant, from the reliable sources, to show that the Greek Cypriot para-military organizations in concert with the Greek Cypriot police alerted, issued with arms and lectured on weapon handling and military tactics by officers of the Greek Army, contingent immediately prior to the outbreak of fighting in December....The paramilitary organizations of both communities remained armed and on the alert, operating guards by night and observation posts by day, although they complied, in day time at least, with the letter of the agreement to move road blocks. We have received a number of reports which leave little doubt that both communities have been seeking and probably, although we have no confirmation, obtaining additional supplies of arms from outside Cyprus”¹⁴.

Events which had led to a civil war on the island started on December 21. On that day, Greek Cypriot police stopped and interrogated some Turkish Cypriots¹⁵. When the police attempted to search a Turkish Cypriot woman, an angry Turkish Cypriot crowd gathered, the police used their firearms, three Turkish Cypriots were killed¹⁶. This event precipitated shootings throughout the island¹⁷; Greek Cypriot irregular groups attacked the Turkish Cypriots

The key Role of the Municipal Issue, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2001, p.177.

12 Glafkos Cleridis, *My Depositon*, Vol. I, Alithia, Nicosia, 1989, p.164-170.

13 TNA: FCO 51/47, “Turkish Attitude to Cyprus”, Research Department Memorandum, 4 December 1968.

14 TNA: WO 386/2, “Intercommunal Fighting-Nicosia-December 1963”, Joint Intelligence Group (Cyprus), Secret Intelligence Report, No.36, 17 January 1964.

15 Stanley Mayes, *Makarios: A Biography*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1981, p.166.

16 The Turkish Cypriot author Salih, claims that the events happened accidentally. See Salih, *ibid*, p.31.

17 According to the author Dodd this was a trigger for a campaign of violence against the Turkish Cypriots, in accordance with a pre-arranged plan, the Akritas Plan, to oblige them to comply with Greek Cypriot demands for constitutional change. See “A historical Overview”, Clemend Dodd, p.7; In addition to this, according to Claude Nicolet’s research through Ambassador Wilkins correspondence Makarios was responsible of the events: “Ambassador Wilkins later went as far as to allege that the incident was a plot staged by Makarios to get the UN’s attention to the urgency of the Cyprus problem, in order to find sympathy there for the amendments to the constitution, but that the incident got out of hand” See, Wilkins, Embtel Nicosia 383, 26.12.63:SDSNF, 1963, POL 25 CYP, box 3883, NARA; Wilkins, unpublished lecture at the Naval War College, 17.11.71, and in an interview with Parker T. Hart, 7.1.89 quoted from Claude Nicolet, United States Foreign Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention, Bibliopolis, Zurich, 2001, p.186-187.

and the “Bloody Christmas” events unfolded¹⁸. Then, civil war broke out, the partnership and the Republic collapsed in practice¹⁹. Having worried about the security of the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey, as guarantor announced that if the violence did not stop against Turks it would take a military action. Turkey also called Greece and the United Kingdom to intervene militarily. Therefore, being highly worried about the security of its military bases, the UK proposed to Makarios that the forces of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey stationed in Cyprus and placed under British command should assist it in its efforts to secure the restoration of peace²⁰. To ease the situation in the island on 29 December, Sandys asked the Cypriots to consider the neutral-zone plan which also included, “Freedom of movement for British patrols in both sectors of Nicosia, the return of refugees, hostages and other prisoner of both sides”²¹. Next day, a neutral zone (the Green line), was created²². Despite this, tension on the island did not decline, particularly on the political scene. Makarios, unimpressed the British efforts in terms of partition, decided to seek help from the Soviets. Backed by the Soviets, on December 31, claiming that Turkey’s attitude was hostile, Makarios announced that he abrogated the Zurich and London settlements²³. Under pressure from Britain, Makarios reluctantly issued a further statement saying that the treaties had not been abrogated but that the government wished to secure their determination by appropriate means. “Tired” of the issue, as a last ditch effort, Britain decided to organize a meeting in London with the attendance of the three guarantor powers and the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities²⁴. The London conference started on January 15, 1964. But

18 Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais*, East European Monographs, New York, 1982.

19 For the destruction of the republic, see Dimitri S. Bitsios, *The Vulnerable Republic*, Athens, 1973, pp.128-134. Salahi Sonyel, *Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic: British Documents 1960 -1965*, Eothen Press, UK. Clement Dodd, *The Cyprus Imbroglia*, Oethen Press, Cambridge 1988; Sotiris Rizas, *Enosis, Partition, Independence: The United States and Britain in Search for Solution to the Cyprus Question, 1963-1967*, Vivliorama, Athens, 2000; Mehmet, Hasgüler, *Kıbrıs’ta Enosis ve Taksim’in İflası*, Öteki Yayınevi, Ankara 1998. Bülent Şener, 1963-1964 Kıbrıs Krizi: Türk Dış Politikası Tarihinde Askeri, Siyasal ve Hukuksal Boyutlarıyla Bir Zorlayıcı Diplomasi Uygulaması”, *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları*, No.205, 2013, pp.1-34. See also the latest book on this subject, Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Bir Hınç ve Şiddet Tarihi Kıbrıs’ta Statü Kavgası ve Etnik Çatışma*, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016.

20 TNA: CAB 129/115, Cyprus: Note of a Meeting of Ministers”, 30 December 1963.

21 “British Suggest Zone in Cyprus”, *The New York Times*, 30 December 1963.

22 According to John Reddaway, Britain with commitments elsewhere in the Middle East and East Africa, was able to provide only 2,700 troops for it. See John Reddaway, *Burdawned With Cyprus: The British Connection*, Rüstem yay., Lefkoşa, 2001, p.153.

23 “ He addressed a telegram to the Heads of all States, except the Guaranteeing Powers, attributing the blame for the situation to the aggressive actions of the Turkish Government and announcing that, as a result, the Government of Cyprus decided to abrogate the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance which gave Turkey the excuse to intervene , TNA: CAB 128/38; “Memorandum by Prime Minister” Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 3 January 1964, CM 64, 14th Conclusions, Minute 1 “Katargisanton simfonion eggiseos dia tin Kipron ziti o Makarios” *Eleftheria*, I Ianouariou 1964; “Makarios Garanti Anlaşmalarını Feshe Karar Verdi”, *Milliyet*, January 2, 1964.

24 In a special meeting which was held on 3 January, 1964 the British cabinet also decided

during the talks, no agreement seemed possible. The Greek side asked for the abrogation of the Zurich and London settlements, and the Turks claimed that unified state was dead and that the solution was federation, if not partition²⁵. Deadlock was obvious.

The Cyprus issue was a political 'hot potato' for Britain. Having been involved from the very beginning of the crisis, Britain was seeking a way to get the U.S. involved so as to renounce its responsibilities. The deadlock at the London conference presented the U.K. with the perfect opportunity to request US involvement, believing that the U.S. could not refuse. Britain's suggestion to the US was that an international force should be established and sent to the island²⁶. This force, according to the Foreign Office, should include US troops as part of an allied force to Cyprus if it was to be kept under the NATO framework. Otherwise the issue would be internationalized by the UN²⁷. On January 25, 1964 Under-Secretary of State George Ball explained this to the President Johnson on the phone: "*The British Ambassador was in to see me this morning and he said that they're not prepared to continue alone to try to carry this because of the political problem they find themselves in the history of the hatred of the British on both the Greeks' and Turks' side as far as the local population is concerned. And that he wanted is for us to agree with them on a proposal to try and internationalize the arrangement. Now, this would mean one of two things: NATO going in or the UN?*"²⁸.

Britain placed the bomb squarely into the hands of the US.

that every effort should be made to contain the problem within NATO and prevent the involvement of the United Nations. Otherwise "UK should cease to be in control of further developments; the Afro-Asian bloc would probably seize the chance to press for our complete removal from Cyprus; The Greek and Turkish Governments would be tempted to make formal declarations of policy which would make it even more difficult for us to achieve communal agreement at the subsequent conference; and Archbishop Makarios would be given the opportunity to propose, as he was known to have in mind, that the United Nations should declare that the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were invalid" See, TNA: CAB 128/38. "CM 64, 14th Conclusions, Minute 1, Memorandum by Prime Minister" Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 3 January 1964.

- 25 Claude Nicolet, *United States Foreign Policy towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention*, Bibliopolis, Zurich, 2001, s.193
- 26 According to Reddaway, Britain with commitments elsewhere in the Middle East and East Africa, was able to provide only 2,700 troops. See John Reddaway, *ibid*, p.153; "Greek vs Turks in Cyprus", *The New York Times*, 16 February 1964. UK needed peace in Cyprus because of its commitments in Malaysia and East Africa. The problems of Malaysia, Cyprus and East Africa could not have been handled without a unity of effort unprecedented in what we call, for want of a better term, times of peace. See TNA: "Memorandum by Ministry of Defense, 1964, 4th February 1964, CP, (64) 32
- 27 FRUS: "Memorandum of Conference With President Johnson", doc.3, s.39-42.
- 28 Foreign Relations of the United States, (FRUS) 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, (Ed. James E. Miller), United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 2000, "Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)" Document No. 2, p.37-38.

1. Enosis?

Apparently, the *Enosis - Taksim* struggle had resumed. Slightly more than three years had passed since the proclamation of the founding of the Cypriot Republic, when Cyprus reappeared on the political agendas of Turkey, Greece, Britain and the US. This time the problem was even more severe, as there was an imminent threat of rupturing the whole fabric of peace in the region. On the eve of the Cuban Missile Crisis, with its ever deepening embroilment in Vietnam and with many international responsibilities, the US faced a huge dilemma: to get involved or not?

Initially, President Johnson abstained. But George Ball was in favor of U.S. involvement. According to him, since Cyprus was a strategically important piece of real estate at issue between the two NATO partners Greece and Turkey, the US had to get involved, thus keeping the issue under NATO control²⁹. He was convinced that Britain was definitely not prepared to mediate the crisis and wanted the US to agree with them on a proposal to try and internationalize the arrangement. Now this would mean one of two things: NATO or the UN. Therefore he suggested that the US accept the British proposal and on the same day in a telephone conversation with President Johnson, he tried to explain why. First of all Turkey, was on the verge of intervening and a war between Turkey and Greece was imminent. From the very beginning of the crisis, Turkey had promised to the US that it would consult before intervening in Cyprus³⁰. In other words, the ethnic conflict in Cyprus was threatening the stability of one flank of NATO defenses and consequently concerned all NATO partners³¹. Secondly, if the issue were taken to the UN, Makarios would ask the UN to come in and a UN peacekeeping force would have Communist elements in it. Avoiding a war between Turkey and Greece and keeping the issue under NATO control, the State Department accepted the British proposal and appointed Ball as mediator between the parties. He tried to convince the President by arguing: *"The tripartite negotiations of the three guarantor powers the UK, Greece and Turkey, have broken down in London. Prime Minister Inonu is in charge of a weak government in Ankara and may have trouble keeping civilian control of the Turkish military. Tired of continued outrages against Turkish Cypriots, they could invade. In Athens where there*

29 George W. Ball, *the Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, New York, W.W. Norton, 1982, p.342.

30 FRUS, doc.5, s.44-46. On 28, the January Turkish Prime Minister Inonu informed the US ambassador, Raymond Hare that "Turkey was prepared to use force to protect the rights and security of Turkish Cypriots should violence recur in Cyprus". The same day Inonu, just before the arrival of Lemnitzer, told the Hare that the Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin had been ordered to return to Ankara with the Turkish delegation from the conference in London because the negotiations were deadlocked. "Turks Ready, Premier Says", *The New York Times*, 29 January 1964; "Turks Ready, Premier Says", *The New York Times*, 29 January 1964; "İngilizler çekilirse müdahale edeceğiz", *Milliyet*, 29 February 1964.

31 Joseph S. Joseph, *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics: From ndependence to the threshold of European Union*, Mac Millan Press, 1999, p.82-83.

is a caretaker government, there may be a military coup and the prospect of such a coup would be greatly increased by serious fighting in Cyprus. Then we would have a full-scale war between two NATO allies in the Mediterranean"³². On 28 January, Inonu also warned the US ambassador, Raymond Hare that "Turkey was prepared to use force to protect the rights and security of Turkish Cypriots should violence recur in Cyprus"³³.

Finally, Johnson accepted the British plan and decided to intervene³⁴. Following the negotiations, the Anglo-American NATO peace plan was accepted by Turkey. In Greece, the Paraskevopoulos caretaker government, under heavy pressure from the opposition,³⁵ accepted the plan reluctantly and declared some conditions. First and foremost, Makarios would also have to accept the plan. Secondly, the peacekeeping force to be sent to the island was not to get involved in political issues. Thirdly, the Turkish forces on the island should not be increased. Instead it would be better for both the Turkish and Greek forces to leave the island. Lastly, the Allied forces were to respect Makarios as the President of Cyprus³⁶.

Taking advantage of the turmoil in Greek politics, Makarios rejected the plan³⁷. Actually from the very beginning he was against the NATO concept and was of the opinion that his aims could only be achieved through the UN, and that Turkey's strategic position would always carry weight with NATO to reject the Anglo-American proposal³⁸. As we put it at the beginning, his real intention

32 FRUS: doc.1, p.35-36.

33 According to British authors O'Malley and Craig this was an open note for the US: the US should do its responsibilities: agree within a day to take action, or they will invade. Brendan O'Malley, Ian Craig,, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion*, I.B.Tauris Press, London, 2001, p.95

34 For the US intervention in the Cyprus Crisis of 1964, see, H.W. Brands, "America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 23:3, 1987, pp 348-362. T. W. Adams, "American Concern in Cyprus", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 401:95, 1972, pp.95-105. Philippos K. Savvides, "U.S. Foreign Policy towards Cyprus: Is the "Theory of Continuity", Still Relevant?" *The Journal of Hellenic Diaspora*, pp: 31-59. Laurence Stern, "Bitter Lessons: How We Failed in Cyprus", *Foreign Policy*, No: 19, 1975, pp.34-78., Van Coufoudakis, "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: An Interpretation", *Millenium*, Vol.5, No.3, December 1976, 457-473; Theodore A. Kouloumbis, "The US Mediation in the Greek-Turkish Disputes since 1954" *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol 16, N.2, Spring 2005, p.113.

35 The plan caused a great debate in Greek politics. The main opposition party Enosi Kentrou (EK) of G. Papandreou strictly rejected the plan. In his view, the Cyprus issue had to be handled at the UN. On the other hand, according to Panagiotis Kanellopoulos (the leader of the Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosi) if the issue were carried on the UN agenda, it could be used as propaganda by the Soviets. "I Kiverniseis apodehetai alla ipo orous tas protaseis dia to Kipriakon Thema", *Eleftheria*, 2 Fevrouariou 1964.

36 "I Kiverniseis apodehetai alla ipo orous tas protaseis dia to Kipriakon Thema", *Eleftheria*, 2 Fevrouariou 1964.

37 "O Makarios Apokrouei", *Vima*, 5 Fevrouariou 1964; "Makarios' Reply Fails to Resolve Cyprus Deadlock", *The New York Times*, 5 February 1964

38 According to Clerides, "This would amount to an occupation of Cyprus by NATO" Glafkos Clerides in BBC Interview reported in the Washington Post, 31 January 1964, Quoted from Michael Attalides, *ibid*, p.16.

was to create a central government in Cyprus. When he achieved this, his aim was to bring the Cyprus issue to the UN Security Council, to discuss and unchain Cyprus from the Zurich and London agreements. At this point he believed that his best option was to seek help from the Soviets³⁹. And the Soviets, who saw the conflict as an opportunity for the expansion of their influence in the region, were willing to bring Makarios back if he managed to take the issue to the UN agenda.



Caricature: Makedonia, 12 Fevrouariou 1964⁴⁰

Makarios' rejection of the plan and the Soviet involvement in the crisis justified the US fears: that Makarios was being backed by the Soviets and, if the issue came to the UN agenda, the Soviets would use it to gain advantage against them. Both the UK and the US could not afford a situation in which the Soviet Union would be able to veto the proposal⁴¹. Therefore, the US decided to take control of the situation and seek another way to implement the Ball plan and continue taking initiative in seeking a solution within the NATO framework. To this end, Ball revised his plan for the sake of Makarios and launched a diplomatic initiative to sell the new plan to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Ball visited Athens, Ankara and Nicosia. Ball achieved convincing Athens and Ankara. Trying to convince Makarios, Ball revised the plan twice and even held a series of talks

39 "Rusya Makarios'a askeri yardım için teminat verdi", *Milliyet*, 29.2.1964.

40 "Ο τροχονομος. Apo do meria, parakalo gasponta " [Traffic policeman. This way, please companion. (gasponta (γκασποντα) is not a greek word. it is the greek way to write companion in russian], Makedonia, 12 Fevrouariou 1964. A caricature showing that the Cyprus issue was finally taken to UN Security Council and claiming because of this how the US and Turkey who "aimed at dividing the island" was suprised because of this issue.

41 TNA: CAB 128/38, "Cyprus" Minute 1, Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, 6 February 1964, CM 64, 10th Conclusions,

with him in Nicosia. However, in the end, Ball failed to persuade him⁴². After two weeks of *shuttle diplomacy*, Ball, hopelessly, reported to Johnson: "I believe the bomb has already gone off in Sarajevo and the archduke is dead. Both governments and people of Greece and Turkey want peace, but they are like characters in a Greek tragedy. They cannot, by their own unaided efforts, avoid catastrophe". The issue was taken to the UN Security Council on 15 February 1964 by Britain.

Meanwhile, probably one of the most important developments that would determine the fate of Cyprus took place in Greece. On 16 February, George Papandreou's *Enosi Kentrou* won the elections. Actually Papandreou had come to power on November 8, 1963 with 42 percent but had to resign because he did not have the confidence of parliament. Now, with 52.8 percent of the vote (the largest majority in Greek history), he came to power and had the opportunity to form a strong government. According to the American ambassador to Greece, Labouisse, unlike the previous Paraskevopoulos caretaker government "the overwhelming electoral victory [of] Papandreou would be the key to Greece playing a constructive and decisive role in the Cyprus question; his election could well prove a turning point in history as he was probably the only man who could move the problem toward solution"⁴³. Failing to keep the issue under the NATO framework, the State Department believed that this development was a great chance to end the conflict between Turkey and Greece. Washington also expected from Papandreou to get Makarios in hand to avoid conflict between the two communities and to fight the communist danger on the island⁴⁴. With this in mind, President Johnson turned to the newly elected Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou for help with Cyprus. On 20 February 1964, he wrote to him:

"...Truly, this is a time which requires the closest collaboration of all the allies concerned if we are to surmount the crisis. The US, because of its deep commitment to the NATO alliance, will do whatever it can to help. Nor are we pressing for any specific long-range solution. On the contrary, as we have repeatedly sought to make clear, the United States has no position on terms of any final settlement. What we all need immediately is the reestablishment of law and order so that the parties can proceed to the search for solutions acceptable to all. And let me assure you that we are neither favoring Turkey at the expense of Greece nor vice versa. Our interest is – as it has been since 1947 – that of supporting the security and well-being of two close NATO allies. As we see it, the common need of Greece, Turkey, the US, and the UK to stick together is paramount. It will take the highest statesmanship on all sides, but especially in Athens and Ankara, to prevent a wholly unnecessary debacle – and one which threatens the very security of both Greece and Turkey – from being precipitated by the Cypriot extremists of both sides. In this critical period it is important that our representatives keep in close

42 FRUS, doc.13, p.63-64.

43 FRUS, doc.17, p.71-73 .

44 FRUS, doc.17, p.71-73.

touch with each other, in Nicosia and New York as well as Athens and Washington. We recognize the special responsibilities which Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom must continue to bear, but you may count on us as well"⁴⁵.

Regarding "the communist threat in the island"⁴⁶ Papandreou was of the same opinion as the State Department. But eliminating this "danger" from the island and ending the turmoil in Greek-Turkish relations the Greek President had his own agenda. He had no intention of cooperating with Washington. He was of the opinion that the London and Zurich agreements were a "crime" against the nation, that the Cyprus crisis was the "tragic result" of these agreements. He had built his election campaign on Cyprus and accused the Karamanlis Government of selling Cyprus out with the London and Zurich agreements. Now under his presidency, his policy towards Cyprus was to get rid of the London and Zurich Agreements and to achieve *Enosis*⁴⁷. Papandreou was convinced that the UN resolution would be a perfect opportunity to achieve this⁴⁸. The resolution would help Makarios to dispose of the London and Zurich agreements and achieve full independence. Afterwards, *Enosis* would be announced⁴⁹. According to Britain, Papandreou believed that *Enosis* would help him achieve "political glory"⁵⁰. Therefore, achieving his goal, Papandreou aimed at cooperating with Makarios. On 25 February he sent a message to Makarios which assured him of the support of the Greek government and invited him to proceed in harmony⁵¹. At meetings held between Makarios and Papandreou a consensus was reached. Both sides agreed that an "independent Cyprus was to be demanded at the UN and after this goal was accomplished, *Enosis* was to be announced⁵². Thus, on 27 February, at a meeting with the ambassadors of the US and Britain, Papandreou openly said that Greece fully supported Cyprus in taking the issue to the UN and added: The Greek Government does not accept that Turkey has the right to intervene on the island⁵³. Papandreou said that the ideal solution to the Cyprus issue was the recognition of the principals of "international justice and

45 FRUS, doc.16, p.69-70.

46 According to Petros Garoufalias, his close friend and the Minister of Defense, Papandreou himself was a strict anti-communist and in order for communism not to gain power in Cyprus, he was ready to take all the "necessary measures. Petros E. Garoufalias, *Ellas kai Kypros, Tragika Sfalмата-Efkeries pou Hatikan*, Ekdoseis Bergadi, Athina, 1982, s.28.

47 Kranidiotis Nikos, *Apohiroti Politia Kipros 1960-1974*, Tomos A, Ekdoseis Hestia, Athina, 1985, S.254.

48 Spiros Papagiorgiou, *Apo tin Zurichin eis ton Attilan: I Taragmeni Dimokratia kai i Sinkrousis me tous Tourkous (1959-1964)*, Tomos A, Ekdoseis Ladia, Lefkosia, 1980, s. 324-325.

49 FRUS, doc.17, s.102

50 TNA: FO 371/174757, "British views on *Enosis*", 9 May 1964,

51 "Letter from Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou to Archbishop Makarios", 25 February 1964 (translation) quoted from Stella Soulioti, *Fettered Independence Cyprus:1878-1964*, Volume Two: The Documents, p.819-820.

52 "From the Hague to Foreign Office", 14 May 1964, No.135, DEFE 11, PRO; "Íkanopoieitikan to shedion ton Pende: Oi Kuprioi evgnomonon tin kivernisin", *Eleftheria*, 3 Martiou 19164.

53 "Entatiki drastiriotis peri to Kupriakon: Oi Presveftai HPA kai Agglias eis ton K. Papandreou", *Eleftheria*, 27 Februariou 1964.

true democracy"⁵⁴ and claimed that the "uncompromising attitude of Turkey" derived from the the direct support of the US. He frequently blamed the US openly, arguing that "many in Greece believe that the US supports Turkey". For example in a meeting with Labouisse, on 21 February 1964, he said that

*"If the U.S. fully supported the "right", we would have to take sides – Greece's – for London-Zurich Accords had created impossible situation"*⁵⁵.

During the UN talks, with the encouragement of Papandreou⁵⁶, Greek Cypriots demanded that the Council endorse her independence and territorial integrity as a safeguard against any Turkish attempt to partition the island. Cyprus refused to agree to any reference to the treaty and the Constitution. On the other hand, Turkey wanted the Constitution mentioned, as a confirmation of her right to intervene to protect the Turkish Cypriot Minority⁵⁷. No agreement seemed possible between the parties. Finally on 4 March, the UN revealed a resolution. According to the UN Security Council's resolution of March 4, the Greek, Turkish, British and Cypriot governments all had to approve the choice of Mr. Thant as mediator. It also called on all parties concerned to do nothing that would cause further violence or endanger the peace of Cyprus. On 4 March, 1964, the UN Security Council issued the resolution which gave the responsibility to the Government of Cyprus to restore law and order, invited all members to refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Cyprus, approved the formation of a United Nations peace-keeping force, and appointed a mediator⁵⁸.

The decision aroused a sense of defeat in Turkey whereas there was a feeling of victory in Greece and among the Greek Cypriots. The Greek side saw it as a step towards the abrogation of the Zurich and London agreements. It created disappointment in Turkey because it prevented Turkish military intervention. On 5 March in his statement to the press, Papandreou said that *"the dangerous phase of the Cyprus problem came to end. UN Security Council accepted unanimously that international peacekeeping force is sent to the island. We are satisfied because the decision was according to the international justice. International Military Power will be the guarantee for the peace in the island. From now on there will be a mediator and this is a beginning of a new "sustainable regime" in the island. This was dangerous period of the problem finished and only political problem stayed"*⁵⁹.

54 "I Ellas Apokrouei Katigorimatikos", *Makedonia*, 25 Apriliou 1964, p.5.

55 FRUS, doc.17, s.71-73

56 David Close, *Ellada 1945-2004*, Met. Georgios Mertikas, Ekdoseis Thyrephen, Thessaloniki, 2004, s.208.

57 "U.N Deadlock Persists", *New York Times*, February 28, 1964

58 Oliver P., Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus, The Cyprus Communities and the United Nations*, Frank Class Publishers, London, 1998, pp.91-92.

59 "To Simvoulion Asfaleias apadehtei Omofonos tin Protasin ton Pente", *Makedonia*, 5 Martiou 1964.

After the resolution, because of the terrorist activities of Grivas' supporters which were tolerated by Makarios, relations between the communities on the island deteriorated rapidly⁶⁰. On 9 March Greek Cypriots attacked Turkish Cypriots, and conflicts soon spread again throughout the island⁶¹. Turkey sent an ultimatum to Makarios and threatened to intervene to ensure the safety of the Turkish community⁶². When Makarios rejected this, Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war⁶³. Papandreou openly declared that in the case of an intervention by Turkey, Greece would support Cyprus militarily. He said: "A war between Turkey and Greece would be madness. But if Turkey decides to follow this path then we won't hesitate to follow her"⁶⁴. President Johnson intervened, and with an urgent decision at the UN, it was decided to send troops immediately to the island. On 24 March, Severi Tuomioja was appointed as mediator and few days later, the first UN peacekeeping troops reached the island⁶⁵. Attempts at Turkish intervention were prevented and the crisis appeared to have come to an end.

As the State Department and the Foreign Office was increasing pressure on Papandreou, relations between America and Greece continued to worsen⁶⁶. Most probably, in retaliation against the pressure from the US, Papandreou attempted to create anti-American sentiments among the public so as to "terminate" the pro-Turkish attitude of President Johnson. To this end, the Papandreou Government launched intense Anti-American propaganda in the press and on the political scene. Anti-American demonstrations were continuously organized in Cyprus and Greece. At the end of February, hundreds of Greek students, who carried a picture of Johnson wearing a Turkish Face, held a demonstration in Athens. In this demonstration, it was stated that America is beside Turkey in the Cyprus crisis⁶⁷. Demonstrations in favor of the resolution began and spread all over Greece after 5 March, and they soon took on an anti-NATO and anti-American character⁶⁸. For instance in a demonstration which was held in Thessaloniki, and which was likely government sponsored, demonstrators shouted the following

60 Kostas Mardas, *I Ellada sta diktia ton Vaseon: Apo to dogma Trouman ston A. Papandreou*, Triti Ekdosi, Ekdoseis Kastanioti, Athina, 1990, s.140.

61 TNA: PREM 11/ 4708, Ministry of Defence, Cyprus Situation Report No: 80, 8 March 1964; "All-Day Fighting Rages on Cyprus; Town is Cut Off", 10 March 1964, *New York Times*; "Çarpışmalar Dün Bütün Kıbrıs'a Yayıldı", *Milliyet*, 9 March 1964; "Greeks and Turks fight in blazing Cyprus Town", *The Times*, 10 March 1964, s.12

62 TNA: PREM 11/4707, Ankara to Foreign Office, No. 474, 13 March 1964; TBMM'deki tartışmalar için bkz. *Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi*, Cilt:28, I. Dönem, Toplantı 3, 11.3.1964.

63 TNA: PREM 11/4707 "Cypriot Reply to Turkish Note", Nicosia to CRO, Telegram No. 884, 13 March 1964.

64 K. Theodoropoulos, *Apo to Dogma Trouman sto Dogma Hounta*, Ekdoseis Papaziseis, Athina, 1977, p.237.

65 "Mediator for Cyprus", *The New York Times*, 25 March 1964.

66 David Close, *ibid*, p.208-210.

67 "Greece Demands Revision of Pacts on Cyprus Rule", *New York Times*, 1 March 1964

68 Dionysios Chourchoulis and Lykourgos Kourkouvelas, "Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, December 2012, 497-514

slogans: “Yankees take the fez out”, “NATO out”, “America and Britain take your hands out of Cyprus”⁶⁹. The Greek Newspaper *Ta Nea* (the best-selling newspaper of the period) began publishing a series of articles with the headlines: “Vietnam: dirty war”. Another headline of the same newspaper was: “America is in a difficult situation: strikes, disasters, declining reputation”⁷⁰. A repressive policy towards publications that criticized Greece’s policies on Cyprus and Makarios was seen. The BBC and the Voice of America, which were broadcasting on Greek National Radio, were first “warned” because they were broadcasting the words and meanings of an attack against the Greek national dignity and reputation⁷¹. Soon both would be closed.



Caricature: Makedonia, 24 April 1964.⁷²

Bringing the crisis to an end, Papandreou asked the State Department to help Greece achieve Enosis. Papandreou’s proposal was taken seriously into account by the State Department, given the ethnic crisis in Cyprus as well as Makarios’ actions which threatened the stability of NATO and acted as a provocation to Turkey to intervene in the island. In an attempt to solve the problem as soon as possible, in order to prevent further involvement of the Soviets, the State Department discussed the proposal. According to the American ambassador to Cyprus, Belcher: “Enosis would tie Cyprus firmly to the West; remove a constant irritant in Greek politics and the same time weaken the Soviet

69 “To Simvoulion Asfaleias apadehetei Omofonos tin Protasin ton Pente”, *Makedonia*, 5 Martiou 1964.

70 Ioannides D. Stefanidis, *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945-1967*, Ashgate, England, 2007, p.225-226.

71 Ioannides D. Stefanidis, *ibid*, p.226.

72 “To Haidemeno tous” (spoiled), *Makedonia*, 24 April 1964. The newspaper wants to show that the US was supporting and spoiling Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue.



Caricature: *Makedonia*, 15 Iouliou 1964⁷⁵

ability exploit the issue in Greece; eliminate the security concerns of Britain, Turkey, Greece and the US; reduce the danger of the growth of communism on the island, end Makarios' "neutral" foreign policy maneuvering and give the US a friendly government with which to negotiate a satisfactory status for the American communications facilities"⁷³. Labouisse agreed with Belcher: "Unfortunately, so long as the Greeks are convinced that "justice" is on their side and that the U.N. will support their view of justice; there is precious little initiative to be expected from them to date. The only proposals to this end which Papandreou has advanced have been his suggestion that enosis would meet Turkey's security worries by having Cyprus become part of NATO". The alternative was to have a second Cuba in the Mediterranean. According to Lord Harrington

"If Cyprus became a second Cuba, the bases might well become a second Guantanamo!"⁷⁴.

From the very beginning of the crisis, Turkey had acted in harmony with the US and the Anglo-American plan had been accepted without hesitation. Despite being right as a guarantor power to secure the Zurich and London agreements to intervene in the island militarily, Turkey had not realized this with an advice from the U.S. But, three months after the UN resolution, Turkey concluded that with every passing day its position in Cyprus was weakening and the pressure on the Turks was increasing⁷⁶. Therefore, Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu, who was also of the opinion that *Enosis* was just around

73 FRUS, doc.29, p.97-99.

74 TNA: PREM 11/4709 "Andreas Papandreou-Lord Harrington Görüşmesi", FO to Athens, No.1672, 9 May 1964.

75 "Η ιστορία επαναλαμβάνεται" [History repeat itself], *Makedonia*, 15 Iouliou 1964. The caricature aims at showing that Johnson threatened Papandreou by sending him a letter to negotiate with Turkey.

76 "Amerika Kıbrıs işine Karışmıyor ve taksimi desteklemiyor", *Milliyet*, 13 Nisan 1964.

the corner and that the US was not willing to prevent it, “decided to show that it is decisive to intervene on the island”. Inonu’s priority goal was to secure Turkey’s rights in the island and provoke active U.S. involvement. On 4 June, 1964, the decision was announced to the US. Fearing that Turkey was serious about intervening and that the decision would spark a war between Turkey and Greece, the State Department wrote a letter to Inonu in an attempt to dissuade Turkey from intervening on the island. In his powerful diplomatic note, Johnson threatened İnönü saying that “*if unilateral Turkish action on the island invited a Soviet attack, then NATO was not obligated to defend Turkey*”⁷⁷. According to Ball the letter was “the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb”⁷⁸.

2. Enosis with “compensation” to Turkey?

The letter worked; Turkey did not intervene. But, just as Turkey had anticipated, it marked the beginning of active US involvement in the Cyprus crisis. The State Department concluded that the risk of war was still in the air and Turkey could not be held in check forever and that “their influence would rapidly dissipate and the consequences could be terrifying”⁷⁹. The US was still concerned that Cyprus would undermine the strategic balance in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey was likely to intervene because of the treatment of ethnic Turks, and a Greco-Turkish war could follow, fracturing the previously good relations of both countries with the United States, strengthening the Soviet Union’s position in Cyprus, placing a strain on the UN, and disrupting NATO harmony. Therefore, the U.S. aimed at bringing Turkey and Greece to the negotiation table so as to discuss and “narrow the gap” on the basis of *Enosis* and reach an agreement which Makarios would have no choice but to accept. To inform the leaders about this new approach, Johnson invited them to Washington DC.

In Washington, Johnson proposed that İnönü and Papandreou to have secret talks to end the deadlock⁸⁰. His intention was to convince the two leaders to solve the issue as it was proposed in 1959: to determine the fate of the island through negotiations between Turkey and Greece, to eliminate Makarios and to bring Cyprus under NATO before it was too late. Talks with Inonu resulted in full agreement. During his talks with Papandreou, Johnson tried to “warn” him of “the threat and the reality of Turkish intervention” if no agreement between the parties was reached. But Papandreou believed that Johnson was bluffing. He rejected the proposal and said that he saw no point in discussing the issue with Ankara. He argued that giving concessions on the island to Turkey would mean

77 FRUS, doc.54, p.152-154.

78 Ball, *ibid*, p. 350. For detailed analysis of the letter from Turkish the point of view, see Haluk Şahin Gece Gelen Mektup Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Dönüm Noktası, Cep Yayınları, İstanbul 1987; Süha Bölükbaşı, “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.29/3, 1993, pp. 505-525.

79 FRUS, doc.75, p.204-207.

80 FRUS, doc. 76, p.208-212.



partition and therefore this could not be accepted. He alluded to other possible solutions, saying that in the case of partition, the non-Turkish part of the island would become Communist. Concerning the possibility of Greece giving something up to Turkey as part of a solution, Papandreu said that Greece wanted nothing in Cyprus its position was “merely that, through democratic principles, the majority can rule and the minority can be protected.” He put the question “if Greece does not take anything, why should Greece give anything?” He asserted that the question of enosis was a matter for the Cypriots; that self-determination would be good for Cyprus and for the Free World”. He also argued that “*On the legal side, the right of intervention was lost when Cyprus entered the UN.... There was no longer any basis for intervention. A century ago, it [Turkey] sold Cyprus, so what valid right does it have?*”. The only possible solution, Papandreu argued, was “unrestricted independence”⁸¹. In his opinion Turkey had a “spoiled child complex” in which it sought to obtain concessions from the U.S.⁸².

Caricature: Makedonia, 1 Iouliou 1964⁸³

Why did Papandreu not want to negotiate? Because he was of the opinion that the advantage was on the Greek side. Unlike the US, Turkey’s threat for intervention had almost no effect on Greek politics. Rather, Papandreu was convinced once again that the US would never allow Turkey to send troops to the island. In Papandreu’s mind, this was seen as another important move towards Enosis. With this feeling of confidence he continued his “plans” and accelerated the Enosis activities on the island. On 12 June, Grivas, the former

81 FRUS, doc. 74; doc. 75, p.200-207.

82 FRUS, doc.57, p.158-160.

83 “Papandreu: Ego Kirie simmahos protimo na min to foreso” [Papandreu: As your ally I prefer not to wear], *Makedonia*, 1 Iouliou 1964.

leader of the Greek Cypriot terrorist movement against British colonial rule was sent to Cyprus⁸⁴. General Grivas was an implacable enemy of Communism and a former political rival of Archbishop Makarios. Now, his duty as Greek Foreign Minister Costopoulos stated, was to gain control of the irregular forces, the communists, and Makarios on the island⁸⁵. According to him, Grivas was their main hope against the Communists and that Makarios had to go along so far⁸⁶. Following Grivas' return, Greece kept deploying troops to the island. During July, 3000 more than soldiers were sent to the island and this number reached 7,328 soldiers and 957 officers at the end of August⁸⁷. On 15 June, Papandreou wrote a letter to Johnson: "As events have developed, the Cyprus problem has ceased to be a Greek-Turkish question. It has become a problem between the two worlds. The dilemma is: "Natofication" or Cuba. "Natofication" can be achieved only through Union with Greece. As a result of Union, the entire island, being part of Greece, could become a NATO base, like Crete. Internal Communism will diminish considerably, as in Greece, where it was reduced to 12%. Thus, the security of Turkey and the entire Middle East will be fully safeguarded. If Natofication of Cyprus does not occur, the island will inevitably be transformed into another Cuba because internal communism will become all-powerful, and active support from the Soviet Union will be unavoidable"⁸⁸.

The Washington talks brought no consensus. On his return to Athens, Papandreou said in parliament that the "struggle continues and it has many stages. But we have decided to remain faithful to our big promise. We will always follow Greek foreign policy and we will not compromise our national goal. I am sure that at the end, democracy, Cyprus and Greece will be victorious"⁸⁹. However, Johnson's pressure on Papandreou continued. On 1 July, 1964 President Johnson, wrote to Papandreou:

"...First of all, let me say that the last week has only strengthened my deep conviction that the problem of Cyprus grows more urgent and dangerous with every day that goes by. Until we can get serious negotiations started, we must recognize that time will not work on the side of peace. Right now we are coming near to the last hour. That is why I hope our two Governments can agree in the view that in this very dangerous situation it is absolutely essential that

84 Kranidiotis, *ibid*, p.185.

85 FRUS, doc.84, p.231-232.

86 FRUS, doc.84, p.231-232.

87 TNA: PREM 11/4710, New York to Foreign Office, No.147017 July 1964; Petros E. Garougalias, *Ellas kai Kipros, Tragika Sfalmeta-Efkeries pou Hatikan (1964-1965)* Ekdoseis Bergadi, Athina, 1982, s.124. In a meeting which was held in Athens on 11-12 April 1964, Makarios and Papandreou had agreed completely on *Enosis* policy. They had also agreed that a solution to the Cyprus issue would only be sought under the framework of the UN and, that for the protection of Cyprus, Greek troops would be deployed. These soldiers were to be sent to the island according to this agreement.

88 Angelos S. Vlahos, *Mia Fora ki Ena Kairo Enas Diplomatis*, Tomos D, Vivliopolion tis Esteias, Athina, 1986, pp.511-512.

89 "Elliniki Eksoteriki Politiki eis to Thema tis Kiprou", *Eleftheria*, 4 Iouliou 1964.

serious and searching talks should be started promptly. I promise you that my conviction that we are at the edge of a crisis is not lightly formed. It rests on two powerful facts: the first is that passion on Cyprus is now intense on both sides, and the second, that the build-up of armaments on the Island continues. This is a condition which is bound to become increasingly explosive; indeed, the build-up of armaments on the Island is already dangerously close to the flash point. And even without an immediate explosion the belief that danger is steadily increasing could at any time create pressures for intervention in Turkey which may prove irresistible. Having prevented such intervention by most strenuous efforts last month, I know very well that there is a limit to what any of us can do from now on, to prevent the Turks from exercising rights which very real indeed to them.. The pressure on Turkey for action is extremely strong and they too derive from a deep conviction that Turkish rights are at stake... If there is not such a negotiation, none of us can prevent a disaster for which all of us will be held accountable"⁹⁰.

It is quite obvious that the language of the letter was not as threatening as the one that Johnson wrote to İnönü. But it also did not leave much choice to Papandreu: "*Negotiations*" or "*Turkish military intervention*". Papandreu saw it as an ultimatum. He said to the American Ambassador that "....Greece cannot act under pressure of an ultimatum. We did not accept an ultimatum from our enemies in 1940 and it is very difficult for us to accept an ultimatum today from our friends"⁹¹. He argued that America is saying "more of the same" and blamed America for not having a policy towards Cyprus. He directed the following questions to the President: "How can a nation maintain its position as the leader of free world unless it has a policy? How can it fail to continue to support the principle of self-determination? How can the US fail to say to Turkey – or to Greece for that matter: "the arms which you possess are arms which we have given you for the purpose of self-defense? We will not accept that our arms will be used in an aggressive manner, risking the danger of war, perhaps a small war, but one which could escalate into a large war." How can Greece's NATO allies fail to tell the Turks that they do not accept aggressive actions which may precipitate a war? Greece can accept a political struggle; Greece can accept a debate in the UN and in NATO; but Greece cannot accept a policy which justifies the use of force"⁹².

Although he disagreed, Papandreu, seeing no other option, unwillingly (and possibly tactically) accepted. Secret negotiations between Ankara and Athens began on 9 July, 1964. On 14 July, 1964, the US mediator, Dean Acheson proposed that: Cyprus would be unified with Greece and Greece would cede to Turkey a full sovereign area in the Karpas Peninsula. Turkey accepted the proposal but seeing the Turkish sovereign base area as a form of partition Greece,

90 FRUS, doc. 80, p.219-220.

91 Reference was to the Greek Government's rejection of an ultimatum from Italy.

92 FRUS, doc.81, p.221-222.

Papandreou rejected it. Instead, he suggested that the island Kastellorizon or a sharing of one of the British base areas would be negotiable⁹³.

As no agreement between the parties seemed possible, ethnic tension on the island reached a climax when Greek Cypriot forces, under the command of Grivas, attacked the strategically important Turkish villages, Kokkina and Mansoura, located in island's north-west coast, and killed 25 Turkish Cypriots⁹⁴. Interestingly, more than 6,000 UN troops on the island which were sent for peacekeeping took no action. Turkey had not intervened on the island during the bloody Christmas events against the Turks, during the March attacks and in June because of the Johnson Letter. Under substantial domestic pressure to intervene on the island, the Inonu Government concluded that the "threats had lost their meaning". Therefore İnönü decided to take action. On 8 August, Turkish air force began bombing the Greek positions in Kokkina region⁹⁵ and as a result, according to the Cyprus government report, 24 Greek Cypriots were killed and at least 200 were wounded⁹⁶. Turkish President Cemal Gürsel also warned that unless the Greek Cypriotes showed reason, action would continue with increased intensity⁹⁷; İnönü, threatened to intervene if Grivas did not leave the island. As Metin Toker noted, "It has been proved that we are not going to leave Cyprus and we are going to go war for this"⁹⁸. Turkey and Greece were at the brink of a war because, according to an agreement between Makarios and Papandreou, in any attack on Cyprus Greece was to help militarily. On 9 August, Makarios through the US ambassador sent an ultimatum to the Turkish Government: unless Ankara stops bombarding Cyprus by 13:30, the National Guard will embark on a general attack against Turkish Cypriots⁹⁹. He also appealed to the UN and the Soviets for military help¹⁰⁰.

Soviet Premier Krushchev did not miss the chance to get involved in the issue one more time. In a note to İnönü, he invited him to "stop military operations against the Republic of Cyprus" and also sent a supporting message to Makarios assuring him that the Soviets supported Cyprus and its people"¹⁰¹. The Soviet involvement worried the US. Johnson sent urgent appeals to the leaders of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey calling on all sides to use peaceful means to settle the crisis¹⁰². Ball sent a message to Papandreou stating:

93 FRUS, doc.87, p.237-238.

94 TNA: DEFE 11/455, Athens to Foreign Office, No.2403, 9 August 1964.

95 "Tourkika Aeroplana Epolibolisan tin Kipro" *Avgi*, 8 Auoustou 1964; "Tourkika aeroplana horion ti Kiprou, Paramenei Krisimos me Kindinon Anafleksos i Katastaseis eis Kipro" *To Vima*, 9 Auoustou 1964

96 "Chronology June 16,1964- August 31, 1964", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.18, no.4, Autumn, 1964, p.459.

97 "Chronology June 16,1964- August 31, 1964", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.18, no.4, Autumn, 1964, p.459.

98 Metin Toker, "Harekâtn Manası" [The Meaning of the Operation], *Akis*, 14 Ağustos 1964, p.7.

99 Kranidiotis, *ibid*, p.243.

100 "O Makarios eis Moshan kai Kairon pros aitisin stratiotikis Voitias", *To Vima*, 13 Auoustou 1964

101 "To NATO Kaliptei tin Epithesi", *Avgi*, 11 Auoustou 1964.

102 FRUS doc.111, p.286-290.

“The situation in Cyprus is on the verge of holocaust. We are urgently trying to get the Turk planes to stand down and at the same time are pointing out to Governement of Cyprus that they will be regarded as murderers if they lose an attack on Turk Cypriot population generally. Under these circumstances Papandreou must show his leadership by stopping the fighting on the island and getting Makarios under control. We will do all possible to stop further Turkish offensive but Papandreou must get Grivas and his men in hand.. Above all Papandreou and Inonu must now promptly settle this matter along the lines of the Acheson proposals. There is no longer time for horse-trading or equivocation or passionate oratory. This is a time for calm heads, incisive action and rational leadership”¹⁰³.

Papandreou stepped back. Grivas returned to Greece and Greece to Geneva. On 14 August 1964 negotiations resumed¹⁰⁴. Believing that Turkey had moved a considerable distance from its original demands for partition or federation, Acheson’s main hope was that the Greeks would adopt a “serious negotiating position”, particularly regarding the issue of the base. To be sure of this, Johnson sent another letter to Papandreou: “No other question has taken so much of my own personal time and attention” Johnson said and made the following two points: “I fully endorse Mr. Acheson’s conclusion that the Karpas Peninsula has a specific logic in that it protects the approaches to Iskenderun...I urge you to empower your representatives in Geneva to concentrate seriously on the Karpas location at this critical phase of the negotiations”¹⁰⁵.

Even though the State Department was pushing Papandreou to accept the Acheson proposals, Labouisse had not much hope. In his report to the Department on 18 August, he explains why: “Papandreou’s reaction to the events of the last ten days has shown, not surprisingly, considerable emotion and some inconsistency. For example, while he was allegedly threatening Kyprianou with a parting of the ways in the event of a Soviet alliance, and was also in effect asking the US and the Turks to accept his pledge of good faith in giving the Turks a fair deal in the event of Enosis, he was at same time withdrawing the Greek elements from Sixth Ataf and Landsoutheast and presiding over a meeting of the Supreme Council of National Defense which decided to disengage, as necessary, the military, naval and air units of the Greek forces now assigned to NATO. (Greek statement on this makes clear this was direct reaction to GOT withdrawal air defense units.) We consider these Greek gestures unfortunate and untimely but not reversible until the general climate here improves”¹⁰⁶.

On 20 August 1964, Acheson came up with a revised version of the plan: A base area in the Karpas Peninsula where nearly 200 square miles could be leased to Turkey for 50 years. On 20 August, 1964, Acheson wrote to Papandreou

103 FRUS, doc.114, p.293.

104 FRUS, doc.123, p.305-307.

105 FRUS, doc.126, p.312-313

106 FRUS, doc.131, p.321-322.

attempting to convince him: “I am prepared to apply the utmost pressure and persuasion to get the Turks to give up any claim for sovereign territory on Cyprus, to reduce the dimensions of their requirements for a military base on the Karpas Peninsula and to settle the rights of minorities along the lines which I have discussed with Mr. Sossides and which I can translate into a draft to be available tomorrow. Specifically, I would urge the Turks to limit their plan to a lease for 50 years for that part of the Karpas Peninsula running from its northeasterly end to a line drawn north and south just west of Komi Kebir”....With this assurance I would do my best, and believe I could succeed, in obtaining the agreement of the Government of Turkey not to intervene to prevent or to demand prior intergovernmental agreement before the achievement of enosis between Greece and Cyprus. “Without something of this sort the Turks would surely believe themselves to be faced with having their treaty rights almost contemptuously destroyed and themselves faced with the alternatives of unconditional enosis or unconditional independence for a Cyprus under Communist domination”¹⁰⁷.

Ball also instructed Labouisse to tell Papandreou that he had just 48 hours to reach a decision. “Time is really of the essence. That means now. We are talking in terms of a deal within 48 hours. There are real advantages to a Greek decision today. The presence of Garoufoulias on the island should be helpful in making this work. Kyprianou has not yet left for Moscow. Any delay will change the picture to everyone’s disadvantage. From the time of Papandreou’s visit here the Greeks have continually asked us what solution we propose. We have invested enormous time and effort in reaching this decision. This is it”¹⁰⁸. However this “determination” of the US was not seriously taken into consideration by Papandreou. Papandreou believed “the Johnson administration (is) still indecisive and (that it) does not know what really wants”¹⁰⁹. Because America did not clearly express whether they had reached an agreement with Turkey or not, this, in Papandreou’s mind could be turned into an advantage and with a *fait accompli* *Enosis* could be achieved. Therefore during these 48 hours, Papandreou made a risky undertaking. He dispatched Garoufalias to Nicosia and aimed to clarify if “*instant Enosis*” was possible¹¹⁰. But two days of talks brought no agreement.

Makarios was very skeptical about the plan and he did not trust Papandreou. Therefore insisted on “unconditional Enosis” (*αδέσμευτης ανεξαρτησίας*).¹¹¹. Later, he explained Kranidiotis why he said no to Garoufalias:

107 FRUS, doc.134, p.326-327.

108 FRUS, doc.135, s.328-329.

109 During this process, Greek newspapers were also accusing the US for being “unclear”. For example see, “Asafis i Katastasis peri to kipriakon Thema”, *Eleftheria*, 23 Augoustou 1964.

110 Yannis Bitou, *Apo tin Prosini Grammi stous dio Attiles*, B. Ekdosi, Athina, 1998, p.135.

111 Spiros Papageorgiou, *Ta Krisima Dokoumenta tou Kipriakou 1959-1967*, Tomo B, Ekdoseis G. Ladia, Athina, 1983, p.249. According to Papageorgiou Grivas supported the idea of concession to Turkey.

“When Garoufalias proposed instant enosis, I asked him: In the case of a Turkish military invasion in Cyprus what would be the Greek governments’ position? The Greek minister replied that in this case the US would intervene. My other question was whether the US was aware of this plan. Garoufalias replied to me yes! It was clear that this was collusion aimed at implementing the Acheson plan and de facto division of the island”¹¹². He also explained his reasons to the Greek ambassador to Cyprus (1964-1970) Menelaos Alexandrakis: “The Greek embassy had no information about the secret talks between Makarios and Garoufalias. Nearly three months later, on my question Makarios said to me that even though he had considered the instant enosis he rejected it because it would be “stupid heroism”. I would be a hero and the result would be the intervention of Turkey and partition. Greece would be totally weak to do anything. The abolishment of the Cyprus government with our own initiative would be national harm for Cyprus and Greece”¹¹³.



Caricature: Ta Nea 22 Augustos 1964¹¹⁴

112 Kranidiotis, *ibid*, p. 227-228

113 Menelaos Aleksandraki, Viron Theodoropoulos, Evastathios Lagakos, *To Kipriako 1950-1974: Mia Endoskopisi*, Β Ekdosi, Ekdosi Elliniki Evroekdotiki, Athina, 1987, p.38-39.

114 “Protaseis Garoufalias: Makarios, Apokleietai, kati lippei” [Garoufalias Proposals: Makarios, Not possible, something is missing] *Ta Nea* 22 Augustos 1964, A caricature claiming that

Having failed to persuade Makarios, Papandreou came up with new demands for the State Department. Papandreou proposed 99 square miles on the Karpas peninsula claiming that Makarios could not be convinced if he agreed to give Turkey double the area of the British bases. But the State Department disagreed and instructed Labouisse to convey the last offer. On the 21st, Labouisse reported to the State Department: "PM acknowledged the danger which a Communist control of Cyprus would pose for Greece. After listening to the presentation attentively he explained that he must have a solution which can be rationally explained not only to his own people but also to the people of Cyprus and their "devilish leader Makarios." He confirmed offer Costopoulos had made to me two hours earlier that GOG prepared lease an area of 99 square miles on Karpas Peninsula. He added that if he had to deal only with Greek public opinion he could possibly have agreed to lease of roughly 200 square miles. However, in his struggle with Makarios he would be placed in a very difficult, and probably impossible, position if he granted Turks double the area of the two British bases. I stressed again that the area delineated, which appeared to be not much more than 5 percent of land area of Cyprus, was absolute minimum which Acheson considers Turks might be willing to accept. We went over map a number of times showing where Turk demands had originally started and how they had been compressed". According to Labouisse, Papandreou intended to accept this offer. But he explains his dilemma: I believe he would sincerely like to accept the Acheson proposal but he has not yet resolved in his own mind how he can face Makarios and Cypriot opinion as well as his own potential supporters such as Grivas and Georkadzis¹¹⁵.


Labouisse was absolutely correct in his observations. On 21 August, Papandreou wrote to Acheson: "The Turkish Government does not face such a problem as regards Turkish Cypriots who are subservient to Ankara. The problem exists only for us. If we accepted a solution which Cyprus would reject as unjust, the situation would deteriorate. In such an event we may be certain that the Cypriots will continue their struggle and seek aid from wherever it will be possible to obtain it: we already know from where they will ask and obtain it. For this important reason, the conditions of an agreement should not be excessive so that they may be acceptable to Cyprus and thus lead us to a peaceful and definite settlement instead of coming to an insuperable deadlock. Greece could support the idea of a Turkish base, even if the Archbishop did not agree, and could perhaps convince the great majority of Cypriot people to accept it, provided the size of base was limited, for instance, if they corresponded to size of British bases in Cyprus. Your proposal, which I understand is the result of strenuous negotiations, exceeds by far the space necessary for the establishment of a military base and has the nature of limited partition. Unfortunately we

Garoufalias' proposal to Makarios was "partition".

115 FRUS, doc.136, s.330-331.

cannot support such a proposal. The difficulty has become greater owing to the psychological conditions prevailing in Cyprus following the recent Turkish bombing of the civilian population. The climate on island at this moment is most unfavorable to Turkey and NATO. It is also unfavorable to Greece due to her absence during the Turkish aggression”.

But this proposal was rejected by the State Department. Ball said “So far as the United States Government is concerned, this is a last major effort and we do not intend to see it fail”. “We cannot accept the Greek Government’s vacillation and you should make this point quite clear to them. The President has been advised that the Greek Government has accepted our proposal and we intend to proceed on that basis. We are using every possible means to bring about a Turkish agreement and we cannot accept any Greek second thoughts at this point”. “So far as the United States Government is concerned, this is a last major effort and we do not intend to see it fail”. Ball also instructed Labouisse to convey this to Papandreou. Ball also reminded Papandreou that if *Enosis* was to be achieved, it would only be possible at the end of a bargaining process with Turkey¹¹⁶.



Caricature: Makedonia, 23 Augoustou 1964¹¹⁷

116 FRUS, doc.142, s.342-343.

117 “To malono, to malono ki’istera to metaniono, Epanerhontai eis to NATO ai ellinikai enoplai dynameis, ipo ton oron oti oi Tourkoi den tha epitethoun eis Kypron. To “klimakion” omos den prokeita na epistrepsei eis tin Smyrnrin. Sir Aleck Hume: Paidaki einai to hriso mou, tha kanei kai kammia ataxia” [The Greek Armed Forces return to NATO under the condition that the Turks won’t attack Cyprus. However, the task force is not going back to Smyrna. My sweetheart, it is just a young boy, it will do a mischief], *Makedonia*, 23 Augoustou 1964. This caricature intends to show that Turkey was always the “sweetheart of the US and the UK.

Finally, on 22 August 1964 Papandreou gave his official answer: “Oxi”. He rejected the proposals arguing that: “he was not master over the Greek Cypriot community as Inonu is over Turk Cypriots.... [the] Acheson proposal is acceptable to [the] gov[ernment] as [a] way to avoid war and resolve the Cyprus question, but that he is helpless because he could not impose this solution on the island.... He finds himself in a serious impasse and does not know where to turn”¹¹⁸.



Papandreou’s rejection to the Acheson proposals marked the end of US mediation efforts. Johnson’s reaction to this answer was very “heavy”: During his talks with the Greek Ambassador to Washington Alexandros Matsas, as a reaction to the words of Matsas, “Such a plan, no Greek government would accept, Johnson replied: “Then listen to me Mr. Ambassador.... Fuck your parliament and your constitution. America is an elephant, Cyprus is a flea. Greece is a flea. If these two fellows continue itching the elephant, they “may just get whacked by the elephant’s trunk, whacked good... If your Prime Minister gives me talk about democracy, parliament and constitution, he, his parliament and his constitution may not last very long. Do not forget to tell old Papa-what’s his name what I told you- you hear?”¹¹⁹

Caricature: *Ta Nea* 31 July 1964¹²⁰

118 FRUS, doc.143, s.344-345.

119 Wittner, S. Lawrance, *American Intervention in Greece*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1982, pp.303. See also, Christopher Hitchens, *Cyprus*, Quartet Books, London, 1984, p.61-62; Claude Nicolet, *ibid.*, p.280

120 “Amesi i aporipsi tou shediou atsenon: kaka simadia dear Dean. Okto hronia Nai legane”, [Direct rejection of the Acheson plan. bad sign dear dean. For 8 years they were saying YES]. *Ta Nea* 31 July 1964.

According to the State Department and the Foreign Office, Papandreou was to blame for the collapse of the Geneva talks. To the State Department, part of the problem resulted from Papandreou's public support of Makarios to such extent that his government had gradually worked itself into Makarios' pocket¹²¹. On 24 August Papandreou announced that "there is no agreed solution to the Cyprus problem, there is no disagreement between him and Makarios but "full consensus" and the natural solution to the Cyprus problem is only enosis. The same day Kyprianou announced that there was a complete consensus between Greek and Cyprus governments and any territorial concession was not acceptable for the Cyprus government. Furthermore, he added, Greek Government would not accept a solution which is not accepted by Cyprus¹²². The same day, according to the *New York Times*, the Soviets offered Cyprus amounts of \$30 million in economic credits¹²³. On 25 August, Papandreou told the US once more "he was in death struggle with Makarios and he would be more than delighted if a *coup d'état* for unconditional enosis would be achieved in which case Makarios would be his captive". But the State Department had come to the understanding that Papandreou had no power to achieve that. Thus, Ball's answer was clear:

*"You can be assured that I have no intention of giving US agreement to instant enosis without prior agreement with Turks. We are definitely off that ticket"*¹²⁴.

Conclusion

During the 1964 Cyprus crisis, Greece argued that the US sought the partition of the island during the 1964 crisis. The Greek Press often mentioned this and public opinion believed that the US was supporting Turkey. This is absolutely not true. Turkey's desire to use her right of intervention on the island militarily was not actually because of this, but was the result of Makarios' actions supported by Papandreou. The main US concern during this process was to avoid a war between Greece and Turkey, thus achieving *Enosis* and preventing Cyprus from becoming the Cuba of the Mediterranean. Achieving this, the US even agreed to Greek troops on the island. Having also agreed with this policy, Turkey was demanding a sufficient territorial concession on the island, which the Greek side preferred to call "double Enosis". But Greece insisted on unconditional *Enosis*. Seesawing between these two demands, America experienced great difficulties defining a clear policy. During the Geneva talks, the State Department tried very hard to narrow the gap between Turkey and Greece and the Republic of Cyprus so as to achieve the so called "Natofication" of the island.

121 FRUS, doc. 153, p.365-366.

122 "Kiprianou: I Kipros Apokroui kata basin" *Eleftheria*, 25 Augoustou 1964

123 "Soviet reported in Cyprus offer", *The New York Times*, 25 August 1964.

124 FRUS, doc.150, p.359-361

The Acheson proposals, as far as Greece concerned, were perhaps the most important “missed opportunity” to achieving *Enosis*. But Papandreou was of the opinion that the advantage was on the Greek side; that the UN supported the Greek position and that the US would also finally come to agree with the Greek thesis. He also thought that the US would always block the Turkish military intervention on the island. But in the end things did not happen the way Papandreou believed they would. In the end, having avoided a war, the US failed to end the crisis in Cyprus and to convince the parties to reach an agreement. After the 1964 Crisis, the unsolved Cyprus issue continued to be main bone of contention between Turkey and Greece, and in 1967 and 1974 it brought the two countries to the brink of war. At the end of this process, the island was divided into two parts. Since then countless negotiations and plans have been attempted but none of them have managed to reunite the island. Today, Cyprus as the biggest dividing line of Europe continues to be the most important foreign policy issue of both countries, keeping their relations in chains.

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